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No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: 
Protecting Gender Discrimination Named Plaintiffs 
from Employer Attacks 
. * Hlllary Jo Baker 
I don't believe anyone ever wants to sue their employer, and I, 
while I believed that this company would be sued for sexual har-
assment, I did not believe it was going to be me. There just 
seemed to be no choice other than to quit or be forced to quit a job 
that paid well and had great benefits. First, I did it for myself, 
keeping the other women who would be impacted in mind. Sec-
ond, the choice to make this a class action, giving the other simi-
larly situated women the option to stand up for themselves, seemed 
the right thing to do and had nothing to do with "safety in num-
bers." Third, I had the support of many men, union and manage-
ment, who encouraged me and stood by me. Others had laid the 
groundwork a class action was the next step. I 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Discrimination against women in the workplace comes in many forms 
and can be systemic. When system-wide employment practices operate as 
barriers to prevent advancement for many women, class action litigation is 
often the most efficient way to dismantle these discriminatory systems. 
Class action litigation requires at least one named plaintiff2 to represent the 
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I. Telephone Interview with Lois Jenson, Named Plaintiff, Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite 
Co. (Jenson Il), 130 F.3d 1287 (8th Cir. 1997), in Minn. (Oct. 8,2008) (reflecting on her case). 
2. I will use the term "named plaintiff' throughout this Note because it is the most ex-
pansive. Named plaintiffs are listed in the initial complaint and subject to deposition and 
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claims of the class. This role is not easy and, in many instances, makes the 
individual a target for intense scrutiny and retaliation. Some employers use 
a strategy of trying to "knock out" named plaintiffs (either procedurally or 
through intimidation) to make the lawsuit go away. 
When courts permit attacks (such as overly intrusive discovery), it is 
often because defendants have argued that there is a procedural "hook" be-
tween the federal rule on class actions, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 
("Rule 23"), and the discovery sought. For instance, Rule 23, among other 
things, requires that a named plaintiff be an adequate representative of the 
class. Under this prong, employers have justified intrusive discovery to at-
tempt to find any non-job-related "skeletons in the closet" as weapons to 
use in arguing that the named plaintiff is inadequate. An analysis of par-
ticularly abusive instances raises the question of whether these attacks 
serve an ulterior motive to threaten, harass, or embarrass named plaintiffs 
into dropping out of their roles. These tactics may have the even further-
reaching repercussion of deterring others from coming forward. 
This Note will cast light upon the frequent attacks deployed against 
women serving as named plaintiffs in sex discrimination class actions un-
der Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 3 Because the bulk of these 
practices are "behind the scenes" of litigation and typically are not de-
scribed in judicial opinions, this Note will tell the anecdotal stories gleaned 
from interviews with prominent plaintiffs' class counsel and a named plain-
tiff. 
A core belief underlying this Note is that sex discrimination class ac-
tions are an essential tool for civil rights reform. Those brave enough to 
put their names and livelihoods front and center in these contentious, high-
stakes proceedings are performing what Nantiya Ruan describes as an "es-
sential and difficult public service.,,4 Hopefully, exposing abusive prac-
discovery. Once a class is certified, named plaintiffs are called "class representatives." Not 
all named plaintiffs remain in that role; some may be dismissed while others may be added 
to represent additional claims or to better represent existing claims. See 5 JAMES WM. 
MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.25[6] (Jerold S. Solovy et al. eds., 3d ed. 
2008) (discussing remedies for inadequate class representation). 
3. 42 V.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (2000). Title VII makes it an unlawful practice for an 
employer: 
(I) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race 
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify 
... employees or applicants ... in any way which would deprive or tend to 
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely 
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, re-
ligion, sex, or national origin. 
42 V.S.c. § 2000e-2(a). 
4. Nantiya Ruan, Bringing Sense to Incentives: An Examination of Incentive Pay-
ments to Named Plaintiffi in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 10 EMP. RTS. & 
EMP. POL'y J. 395, 396 (2006). 
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tices will lead to greater protections for named plaintiffs in sex discrimina-
tion cases. 
Employment sex discrimination cases can attract a great deal of press 
because they often involve recognizable companies and compelling stories 
of wrongdoing. This can amount to intense pressure on those serving as 
the public "faces" of absent class members. 5 Considering the massive size 
of many of the classes in these cases (for example, Dukes v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. is on behalf of a class of 1.6 million 6 and Shores v. Publix Su-
per Markets, Inc. anticipated a class of approximately 100,0007), named 
plaintiffs are thrust onto a public stage to which they are most likely unac-
customed. 
Those challenging such powerful corporations often face controversy 
and backlash from many fronts. Vocal critics abound; some seemingly 
would have discrimination class actions abolished outright. 8 Faced with 
charges of widespread sex discrimination, employers tend to immediately 
decry the allegations as false and attack those who come forward, rather 
than scrutinizing the allegedly discriminatory systems. 9 
Nonetheless, effecting social change by litigating discrimination 
against women at work is a key feminist strategy. As activist and Professor 
Ellen Bravo succinctly reasons, "We've got lots of work to do on personal 
relationships, but to be on equal footing at home or successfully leave an 
5. See Ruan, supra note 4, at 409. 
6. Press Release, Wal-Mart Class, Plaintiffs Oppose Wal-Mart's Request for Imme-
diate Appeal of Class Certification Ruling in Nation-Wide Sex Discrimination Case (July 
19, 2004), http://www.walmartclass.com!staticdataJpress_releasesfW almPermApplPress 
Release.hml.html (describing the size of the class in Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 
F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004»). See also LISA FEATHERSTONE, SELLING WOMEN SHORT: THE 
LANDMARK BATTLE FOR WORKERS' RIGHTS AT WAL-MART 154 (2004) (describing Dukes as 
"the largest sex discrimination class-action suit ever filed against a private employer"). 
7. Shores v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc. (Shores I), No. 95-1162, 1996 U.S. Disl. 
LEXIS 3381, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 1996). 
A16: 
8. See e.g., Review & Outlook A New Way to Sue, WALL ST. 1., Nov. 13,2006, at 
Talk about stereotyping. The idea that a court should assume every female 
member of the class suffered the same amount of emotional distress seems, 
well, sexist. ... [T]hese lawyers are ready to tee up every deep-pocketed re-
tailer in America on similar accusations if courts let them .... If mere statis-
tical imbalances can trigger a class action, companies will be forced to make 
pay decisions based on statistics rather than performance and merit. Ulti-
mately, that leads to racial and gender quotas, all in an effort to avoid frivo-
lous lawsuits. If these radical legal theories hold up in the Costco and Wal-
Mart cases, the trial bar will gain tremendous leverage. 
9. ELLEN BRAVO, TAKING ON THE BIG Boys: OR WHY FEMINISM Is GOOD FOR 
FAMILIES, BUSINESS, AND THE NATION 106 (2007). See also Telephone Interview with 
Noelle Brennan, Partner, Noelle Brennan & Assoc., in Chicago, Ill. (Mar. 5, 2008) ("Em-
ployers should respond with, 'We are surprised but we take this seriously and we want to 
remind people not to retaliate;' instead they often send the opposite message, which is more 
like 'We think they're a bunch of liars and you should too."'). 
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abusive relationship, women must have economic sufficiency." 10 The sta-
tistics make clear that, as a whole, women are not yet on equal footing in 
the workplace for some employers, it seems that litigation is the only 
way to change these discriminatory conditions. 11 
Section II of this Note briefly presents the history and evolution of Ti-
tle VII sex discrimination class actions and the procedural requirements of 
Rule 23. This Section particularly focuses on the additional challenges 
posed by class actions with sexual harassment claims because these cases 
often provide more discussion of abusive discovery practices and vivid ex-
amples of these employer tactics. Section III analyzes the challenges 
named plaintiffs face and makes some observations about the backgrounds 
and characteristics of those who become named plaintiffs. Section IV pre-
sents common tactics that employers use to attack named plaintiffs in de-
fending against litigation. Finally, Section V provides suggestions for 
plaintiffs' attorneys to prevent and defend against abusive defense tactics 
and offers some suggestions for reform. 
II. THE UNIQUE HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF SEX 
DISCRIMINATION CLASS ACTIONS 
A. SOCIAL AND LEGAL SIGNIFICANcE 
Class actions, though relatively rare,12 are powerful vehicles for social 
change. By statute, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
("EEOC") is responsible for enforcing Title VII, under which plaintiffs 
bring their employment discrimination class actions. However, the EEOC 
has been under-funded since the Reagan administration cut back on the 
agency's budget and staffing levels in the 1980s.13 In the 2007 fiscal year, 
the agency estimated that it would have a backlog of 47,516 cases. 14 
Agency staff numbers have diminished by nineteen percent since 1991 due 
10. BRAVO, supra note 9, at 17. 
11. Though litigation is a powerful tool, it is designed to remedy discreet harms. 
Lasting and maintainable positive change for workers is more likely to be attained through 
organizing. The two strategies may be symbiotic. Lisa Featherstone reasons that the public-
ity generated by Dukes about Wal-Mart's employment practices may inspire workers to or-
ganize. FEATHERSTONE, supra note 6, at 176. Former Wal-Mart employee Joyce Moody, 
now a United Food and Commercial Workers Union organizer, decided to file a declaration 
in hopes of Dukes furthering the chances of a unionized Wal-Mart. Id. at 186-87. 
12. Id. at 171 (noting that civil rights class actions have been on the decline for over 
thirty years: there were 1,174 employment class actions in 1976 compared with only thirty-
nine in 1991, although 200 I showed a slight improvement with seventy-three filings). 
13. BRAVO, supra note 9, at 90. See EEOC, EEOC Budget and Staffing History 
1980 to Present, http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/planlbudgetandstaffing.html(last visited 
Oct. 26, 2008) (staffing went from 3,390 full-time employees at the end of the 1980 fiscal 
year to 2,158 full-time employees by the end of the 2007 fiscal year). 
14. See Christopher Lee, EEOC is Hobbled. Groups Contend: Case Backlog Grows 
as Its Staff Is Slashed. Critics Say, WASH. POST, June 14,2006, at A21. 
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to budget cuts and a longstanding partial hiring freeze. I S In an attempt to 
reduce its budget, the EEOC outsourced its intake calls to a Vangent, Inc. 
contract call center in Lawrence, Kansas, from 2005 until late 2007. 16 
However, the call center employees each received only one week of train-
ing to learn the necessary skills of client counseling, intake, and legal ba-
sics. 17 The budget cuts and the EEOC's burden in trying to adjust to them 
make the EEOC an unlikely source of widespread reform. Thus, the pri-
vate employment discrimination class action has risen in importance as a 
much-needed tool for achieving progress in civil rights. 
Despite the lack of EEOC resources, the number of claims continues to 
increase, a trend which likely signals an overall rise in discrimination. 18 In 
the era of the "big box" or chain retailer, class actions are formidable to 
employers and capable of establishing change at a more systemic level than 
individual lawsuits. 19 Because individual discrimination claims are often 
settled on a confidential basis for monetary relief only, the threat of class-
wide litigation - which generally results in greater damage awards and 
widespread publicity - is a much more serious impetus for employers to 
audit their policies and practices for indicators of discrimination.2o Fur-
thermore, unlike individual cases, class action discrimination suits often 
demand sweeping injunctive relief. 
The injunctive relief ordered in civil rights class actions has resulted in 
major changes in hiring practices, promotion, training, compensation, and 
the corporate culture at many national and regional businesses. 21 The suc-
cess of injunctive relief depends on its structure, the level of judicial in-
volvement, and, perhaps most importantly, the willingness of the corpora-
tion to change. 22 
15. Lee, supra note 14. 
16. Press Release, U.S. EEOC, EEOC Votes to Replace National Contact Center 
with In-House Phone System Using Federal Employees (Aug. 13, 2007), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/press/S-13-07.html. 
17. FY 2008 Appropriations for EEOC, Including Defunding the EEOC's Contract 
Call Center Before the H. Appropriations Subcomm. on Commerce. Justice and State, I 10th 
Congo (2007) (statement of Gabrielle Martin, President, Nat'l Council of EEOC Locals, No. 
216, AFGE/AFL-CIO), available at http://www.counciI216.org/docs/leg/20070424martinc 
jstestimony. pdf. 
IS. BRAVO, supra note 9, at 92. 
19. See Ruan, supra note 4, at 405-06 ("In today's workplace, where a handful of 
conglomerates employ increasing numbers of ... workers, the importance of being able to 
attack unfair labor practices on a class-wide scale cannot be overlooked."). 
20. /d. at 407-0S. 
21. See, e.g., FEATHERSTONE,supra note 6, at 163-67 (discussing the injunctive relief 
in Stender v. Lucky Stores, S03 F. Supp. 259 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Butler v. Home Depot, No. 
C-94-4335 SI, No. C-95-2182 SI, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16296 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28,1997». 
22. Interview with Teresa Demchak, Partner, Goldstein, Demchak, Baller, Borgen & 
Dardarian, in San Francisco, Cal. (Mar. 4, 2008). 
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Discrimination class action lawsuits are particularly important in the 
struggle for women's economic equality. 23 Women face unique and com-
plex challenges in attaining workplace equality due to biases in society and 
inadequacies in current law. The proposed Equal Rights Amendment has 
not yet been ratified. 24 Therefore, constitutional challenges to gender dis-
crimination based on equal protection are afforded a lower level of scrutiny 
than those based on race discrimination. 25 Women also confront height-
ened workplace challenges due to more subtle discrimination based on 
family responsibilities and the design of the workplace to fit the male 
breadwinner model. 26 In 2006, the wage gap between women and men re-
mained virtually unchanged from the previous five years, with women 
making an average of 76.9 percent of what men earn. 27 Over her lifetime, 
the average female high school graduate loses $700,000 to the wage gap. 28 
Female college graduates lose an average of $1.2 million, and women with 
graduate degrees lose $2 million.29 
The wage gap also persists across industries. According to its interpre-
tation of 1997 data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics ("BLS"), Equal 
Rights Advocates30 estimates that women earn less than men in ninety-nine 
23. Though this note focuses on sex discrimination class action cases, I will also 
draw from race, color, and national origin discrimination case law to illustrate the particular 
challenges women in these roles face. Title VII is limited, and in many ways it lags behind 
state and international discrimination law. For example, unlike the laws of some states, Ti-
tle VII neglects to protect persons from discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender 
identity, body size, or familial status, among others. Identity is not as tidy as the Civil 
Rights Act legislators viewed it in 1964. There is a wealth of scholarship on the limitations 
for "sex plus" plaintiffs, such as women of color and disabled women. For a discussion of 
these challenges, see Phillip M. Kannan, Structuring a Case Against Complex Multidimen-
sional Discrimination, 36 U. MEM. L. REv. 335, 356-62 (2006) (arguing that Title VII's pro-
tection for subclasses such as African-American women is canonically weak and proposing 
an alternate theory). 
24. See Allison L. Held et aI., The Equal Rights Amendment: Why the ERA Remains 
Legally Viable and Properly Before the States, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 113, 117 
(1997). 
25. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding sex-based classifications sub-
ject only to "intermediate scrutiny"). 
26. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT 
AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 65 (2000) ("Requiring workers, if they want to achieve equality, 
to exercise the social power typically available only to men - to command a flow of family 
work, to have the kind of body machines are designed around, to relate to others in mascu-
line terms - constitutes discrimination against women."). 
27. National Committee on Pay Equity, Pay Equity Information, http://www.pay-
equity.org/info-time.htrnl (last visited Nov. 9, 2008) (providing a wage gap table spanning 
from 1960 to 2006). 
28. /d. 
29. [d. 
30. Equal Rights Advocates is a nonprofit law firm that has pursued impact litigation 
since 1974 with the goal of "protect[ing] and secur[ing] equal rights and economic opportu-
nities for women and girls through litigation and advocacy." Equal Rights Advocates, 
About ERA, http://equalrights.org/about/about3ra.asp (last visited Oct. 13, 2008). 
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percent of the fields that reported data. 31 Data on the wage gap for mothers 
versus non-mothers presents an even bleaker picture. Mothers who work 
full-time earn only sixty percent of the wages earned by fathers who work 
full-time. 32 Single mothers earn the lowest percentage of men's average 
pay.33 Furthermore, women have the highest rates of poverty. Seventeen 
percent of women and only one percent of men working full-time earn an 
average of $15,000 per year or less.34 Women comprise more than ninety 
percent of long-term low wage earners. 35 A recent study found that nearly 
forty percent of poor, working women could afford to stop receiving wel-
fare benefits if they were to receive pay equity increases to bring their 
wages in line with those of male coworkers. 36 These statistics demonstrate 
that despite significant gains in equal rights, women are still very much 
constrained by the glass ceiling. By not promoting women, businesses trap 
women in a life of overwork and poverty. 37 Though women represent ap-
proximately forty-six percent of the United States workforce, they still hold 
only five percent of the top-level jobs. 38 
In addition, sexual harassment is still shockingly common. Studies es-
timate that between thirty-five and fifty percent of women are sexually har-
assed at some point in their careers. 39 Women of color tend to be harassed 
in higher numbers than white women, and disabled women are more often 
harassed than able-bodied women. 40 As all of these statistics illustrate, the 
task of ending discrimination against women in the workplace is far from 
accomplished. 
B. HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS 
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in the furor of the after-
math of the assassination of John F. Kennedy.41 The law initially aimed to 
cover only race, religion, color, and national origin as protected classes, but 
at the last minute, Howard W. Smith, a segregationist Democrat from Vir-
ginia, inserted "sex," hoping it would be a poison pil1.42 Smith had previ-
31. Equal Rights Advocates, Pay Inequity, http://equalrights.orglpublications/fact_ 
sheets/paystats.asp (last visited Nov. 9, 200S). 
32 WILLIAMS, supra note 26, at 2. 
33. /d. 
34. BRAVO, supra note 9, at 24. 
35. /d. 
36. FEATHERSTONE, supra note 6, at 149 n.13 (citing a study by the National Com-
mittee on Pay Equity, Questions and Answers on Pay Equity, http://www.pay-equity.org 
linfo-Q&A.html (last visited Nov. 9, 200S)). 
37. /d. at 124. For an experiential account of the day-to-day economic struggle for 
the working poor, see generally BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMEO (200 I). 
3S. WILLIAMS, supra note 26, at 67. 
39. BRAVO, supra note 9, at 100. 
40. Id. at 102. 
41. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, The Story of Green v. McDonnell Douglas, in 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES 13,22-23 (Joel Wm. Friedman ed., 2006). 
42. See BRAVO, supra note 9, at 7S. 
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ously bragged, "I have certainly tried to do everything that I could to hin-
der, delay and dilapidate this bill."43 Following jocularity from Smith and 
his male congressional cohorts about the ugly women who would use the 
law to sue for a husband, Martha Wright Griffiths, one of only fourteen 
women in the House, challenged their behavior. 44 
"We've sat here for four days discussing the rights of blacks and 
other minorities," she told them, "and there has been no laughter, 
not even a smile. But when you suggest you shouldn't discrimi-
nate against your own wives, your own mothers, your own daugh-
ters, your own granddaughters, or your own sisters, then you 
laugh.,,45 
To Smith's chagrin, his provision stayed.46 
Rule 23 is similarly rooted in a civil rights tradition.47 Rule 23 has 
been frequently used to further the rights of under-represented and under-
privileged individuals, particularly in civil rights and environmental 
cases.48 In 1966, Section (b )(2) was added.49 This section allows for certi-
fication of classes that plead class-wide injunctive relief and was designed 
by the Rules Committee with the Civil Rights Movement in mind. 50 
Despite statutory support for class actions, a series of Supreme Court 
decisions in the late 1980s ratcheted up the burden on Title VII plaintiffs. 51 
In response to these decisions, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, which reversed some of those decisions and provided more expan-
sive remedies for Title VII plaintiffs. However, some circuits have restric-
tively interpreted the 1991 amendments in the Rule 23 context to the point 
of refusing to certify classes that pray for the expanded remedies. 52 Thus, 




47. Ruan, supra note 4, at 400. 
48. [d. 
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee's note on 1966 amendments. 
50. Ruan, supra note 4, at 400. The other two types of certifiable actions fall under 
Rule 23(b)(I), which is rarely used in civil rights litigation, and Rule 23(b)(3) which is used 
in claims for damages and requires class counsel to give more extensive notice to class 
members. 
51 See Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (reducing employer 
burden of using the business necessity defense), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071; Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 
900 (1989) (women must challenge seniority system when implemented); Crawford Fitting 
Co. v. IT. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987) (expert witness fees not recoverable under 
Title VII). 
52. See, e.g., Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 407 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(because the 1991 amendments provided a $300,000 damages cap and an attorney's fee pro-
vision, individual cases would be economically viable and class treatment was not a "supe-
rior" method of litigation); Reeb v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., 435 F.3d 639 (6th Cir. 
2006); Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695 (lith Cir. 2004); Murray v. Auslander, 244 
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despite their progressive aims, Title VII and Rule 23 have had a somewhat 
limited progressive impact in class actions seeking to further those civil 
rights. 
C. THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A RULE 23 CLASS ACTION 
Discrimination class action cases are far more likely to end up in fed-
eral court than state court. 53 The prerequisites of Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 23(a) are deceptively simple: numerosity, commonality, typicality, 
and adequacy of representation. Because these elements are necessary for 
certification, they are subject to extensive litigation. Named plaintiffs are 
commonly attacked under Rule 23(a)(3) typicality and Rule 23(a)(4) ade-
quacy theories. 
I. Numerosity 
Rule 23(a)(1) requires that the class be sizeable enough that joinder of 
the plaintiffs would be impracticable. This prerequisite is relatively 
straightforward and subject to the least controversy in litigation. There is 
no set number of class members, and courts have held that there is no 
"magical formula" that will guarantee satisfaction of this requirement. 54 
As a general rule, classes numbering greater than forty-one individuals sat-
isfy the numerosity requirement. 55 When the numerosity determination is a 
close one in a Title VII class action, some courts have found the require-
ment satisfied, since cases can always be de-certified later. 56 Though a 
statutory requirement, numerosity rarely presents a significant issue in class 
action litigation. 
2. Commonality 
Rule 23(a)(2) requires that there be "questions of law and fact common 
to the class.,,57 This rule does not require that each member of the class be 
F.3d 807 (lIth Cir. 2001). The Second and Ninth Circuits have adopted a more flexible ad 
hoc test that focuses on the intent of the plaintiffs in bringing the suit. See, e.g., Robinson v. 
Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2001); Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 
937 (9th Cir. 2003). The Seventh and D.C. Circuits have taken a "middle ground" hybrid 
approach and will certify claims using Rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3). See, e.g., Jefferson v. 
Ingersoll Int'l Inc., 195 F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 1999); Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997). 
53. See, e.g., Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint ~ 4, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ), available at 
http://www.walmartclass.comlalUegalpapers.htrnl (pleading under Title VII and Califor-
nia's Fair Employment and Housing Act); Satchell v. FedEx Corp., No. C 03-02659 SI, No. 
C 03-02878 SI, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37354 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2005). The passage of 
the Class Action Fairness Act in 2005 made federal jurisdiction even more likely. 28 
U.S.C.A. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711-1715 (West 2006 & Supp. 2008). See also 
FEATHERSTONE, supra note 6, at 172-73. 
54. E.g., Foster v. Bechtel Power Corp., 89 F.R.D. 624, 626 (E.D. Ark. 1981). 
55. Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 240 F.R.D. 627, 637 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
56. Foster, 89 F.R.D. at 626. 
57. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(2). 
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identically situated, only that there be substantial questions of law or fact 
common to the class as a whole. 58 Furthermore, individual variation 
among plaintiffs' claims does not defeat underlying legal commonality. 59 
To the extent that the parties' commonality arguments overlap with the 
merits, courts must evaluate all relevant evidence to determine commonal-
ity.60 Commonality questions often lead to a "battle of the experts" in 
fields such as statistics, social science, labor economics, and psychology.61 
In early Title VII class actions, courts interpreted the commonality re-
quirement permissively and routinely certified "across the board" Title VII 
class actions. 62 Such cases challenged every aspect of a workplace in one 
complaint, often including hiring, compensation, promotion, and disparate 
treatment. 63 However, the Supreme Court curtailed this format in 1982, 
finding that it was too broad.64 It set precedent requiring district courts to 
"rigorously analyze" all 23(a) prerequisites before certifying a class. 65 To 
satisfy commonality, only one question needs to be common, not every is-
sue. 66 The inquiry into whether there are common questions does not re-
quire plaintiffs to prove the answers to those questions.67 
3. Typicality 
Rule 23(a)(3) applies specifically to named plaintiffs and requires 
"claims or defenses of the representative parties" to also be "typical of the 
claims or defenses of the class.,,68 Courts have acknowledged that in certifi-
cation analysis, commonality and typicality tend to merge. 69 However, 
plaintiffs' claims need not be identical. 70 "To be considered typical for pur-
poses of class certification, the named plaintiff need not have suffered an 
identical wrong. Rather, the class representative must be part of the class and 
possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class members.,,71 
58. Ellis, 240 F.R.D. at 640. 
59. Id. at 641. 
60.Id. 
61. See, e,g., Ellis, 240 F.R.D. at 640 (discussing both sets of Ellis experts and con-
cluding that "plaintiffs have satisfied the court that there are common issues of fact and 
theories oflaw as to gender disparities in promotions ... [and1 the nature ofCostco's culture 
and its effect on women"). 
62. See, e.g., E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405 
(1974) (acknowledging that "suits alleging racial or ethnic discrimination are often by their 
nature class suits, involving class wrongs," though declining to certify such a broadly de-
fined class on the facts of the case before it). 
63. Id. at 402 (discussing the Fifth Circuit's factual findings). 
64. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160-61 (1982). 
65. Id. 
66. See, e.g., Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d lOll, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998); Dukes 
v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 509 F.3d 1168, 1177 (9th Cir. 2007). 
67. Hnot v. Willis Group Holdings, 241 F.R.D. 204, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
68. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). 
69. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157 n.l3. 
70. Staton v. Boeing. 327 F.3d 938, 957 (9th Cir. 2003). 
71. Id. 
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A named plaintiff may also assert separate, individual claims on her 
own behalf in a class case.72 For example, a plaintiff in a sex discrimina-
tion class action may file a separate claim when she has been retaliated 
against. 
4. Adequacy of Representation 
Rule 23(a)(4) also applies directly to named plaintiffs and requires that 
they "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the c1ass.,,73 "Resolu-
tion of two questions determines legal adequacy: (1) do the named plain-
tiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of interest with other class mem-
bers and (2) will the named plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the action 
vigorously on behalf of the class?" 74 Adequacy challenges may rely on al-
leged wrongdoing of the named plaintiff, which defendants offer to show 
that she is not credible or trustworthy, or not qualified for the job in the 
first place. 
5. Other Requirements for Named Plaintiffs 
Named plaintiffs in class litigation maintain a different position than 
plaintiffs in individual litigation. 75 In individual litigation, the plaintiff 
controls the litigation and makes decisions in her own interest, whereas in 
class litigation, the named plaintiff may not advance her interests over the 
interests of the absent class members. 76 
It is also important to note that the role of the named plaintiff varies 
greatly depending on the type of case. 77 At minimum, class litigation must 
have one named plaintiff (though there are usually more).78 Employment 
discrimination classes often have four or five named plaintiffs, though 
some have proceeded with far more. 79 
72. See, e.g., Shores v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc. (Shores /), No. 95-1 I 62-CIV-T-
25(E), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3381, at *22-23 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 1996) ("[T]he mere fact 
that questions peculiar to each individual member of the class remain after the common 
questions of the defendant's liability have been resolved does not dictate the conclusion that 
a class action is impermissible." (citations omitted)). But see 5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, 
§ 23.25[2][b][vii] (collecting cases in which the court found a conflict of interest when a 
named plaintiff had class claims and individual claims). 
73. Before 2003, this rule applied to both named plaintiffs and plaintiffs' attorneys. 
The requirements for adequacy of class counsel are now codified in Rule 23(g). 
74. Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011,1020 (9th Cir. 1998). 
75. Barry Goldstein, Ethical Issues in the Strategy for Preparing and Litigating an 
Employment Discrimination Class Action, 10 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'y J. 505, 509 (2006). 
76. /d. 
77. Ruan, supra note 4, at 409 (reasoning that employment discrimination class ac-
tion named plaintiffs are "litigating about their past (and sometimes current) employment 
histories that often include painful memories and emotional difficulties[, whereas] named 
plaintiffs in consumer and securities class actions have none of these hurdles to face"). 
78. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a). 
79. See Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402,407 (5th Cir. 1998) (affirm-
ing denial of class certification in an "across the board" case with more than 130 named 
plaintiffs). 
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While it is not necessary to represent each geographical region amongst the 
named plaintiffs, it is wise to select representatives from various job sites and re-
gions.80 To achieve class certification, each named plaintiff must have suffered 
an injury caused by each defendant that is representative of the claims of the 
class. 8 1 For example, if the plaintiffs wish to make a claim regarding discrimina-
tion in promotions, at least one named plaintiff must have been denied a promo-
tion. Courts generally allow the class to substitute a new named plaintiff if one is 
dismissed or decides to drop out. 82 
Finally, Title VII has administrative exhaustion requirements. 83 Courts have 
interpreted this as requiring at least one named plaintiff to have filed a timely 
EEOC charge containing claims that are related to the class claims and to have 
received a right-to-sue letter prior to filing suit. 84 Likewise, it is necessary for at 
least one named plaintiff to meet jurisdictional requirements to establish venue. 
m. WHAT DOES IT TAKE TO BE A NAMED PLAINTIFF? 
A. RESPONSIBILITIES AND RISKS OF THE ROLE 
More than other types of class actions, plaintiffs in employment discrimina-
tion class actions face a time consuming and, in some ways, risky undertaking. 85 
Named plaintiffs face particularly difficult experiences in discovery, including 
grueling depositions, intense scrutiny into their personal lives, and questions 
about their knowledge of the case and its legal issues. Both current and former 
employees face the risks of retaliation, isolation, ostracism by coworkers, and 
"blacklisting" by future employers. 86 The role requires an extensive time com-
mitment, especially during the investigation and discovery phases. 87 
80. IntelView with Teresa Demchak, supra note 22. 
81. See 5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, §§ 23.24[1], 23.24[6][a]. 
82. See, e.g., Larkin v. Pullman-Standard Div., Pullman, 854 F.2d 1549, 1560 (11th 
Cir. 1988) (acknowledging this practice though declining to add plaintiffs where they had 
delayed in seeking leave to join the class). In Dukes, named plaintiffs changed between 
each of the amended complaints filed in the case. Compare First Amended Complaint '11'11 6-
11, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ), 
with Second Amended Complaint '11'16-7, Dukes, 222 F.R.D. 137 (No. C-01-2252 MJJ), and 
Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint '11'11 6-12, Dukes, 222 F.R.D. 137 (No. C-01-2252 
MJJ), available at http://www.walmartclass.com!aIUegalpapers.html [hereinafter Dukes 
Complaints]. 
83. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(b), 42 V.S.c. § 2000e-5 (2000). 
84. See, e.g., Beckmann v. CBS, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 608, 616 (D. Minn. 2000) ("The 
'piggybacking' rule will apply if two essential requirements are met: (I) the charge being 
relied upon must be timely and not otherwise defective; and (2) the individual claims of the 
filing and non-filing plaintiffs must have arisen out of similar discriminatory treatment in 
the same time frame." (citing Calloway v. Partners Nat'1. Health Plans, 986 F.2d 446, 449 
(lIth Cir. 1993»). 
85. Ruan, supra note 4, at 396-97. 
86. Id. at 397. 
87. Id. 
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In most cases, at least one named plaintiff is closely involved in the 
litigation from the outset. 88 Before filing a class action, the plaintiffs' at-
torneys conduct investigations that may take months. 89 During that time, 
the named plaintiff is an important fact witness, providing crucial informa-
tion on the employment practices at issue, including decision making, pro-
motion, hiring practices, and organizational hierarchy.9o After filing EEOC 
charges, named plaintiffs also engage in the EEOC investigation process 
and review drafts of the complaint. 91 
Like any other adversarial undertaking, litigation can be very stressful 
for named plaintiffs. This can be aggravated if named plaintiffs already 
have post traumatic stress disorder or other psychological conditions.92 
"The very act of litigation may affect symptoms by a process ... termed 
'retraumatization. ",93 Researchers have found that people engaged in on-
going litigation may suffer psychological harm. 94 
[T]he need to confront the traumatic history through interviews 
with attorneys, depositions, and courtroom testimony thwarts the 
victim's characteristic efforts at avoidance. This predictably re-
sults in the resurgence of intrusive ideation and increased [provoca-
tion]. Further, this is done in an adversarial system that pits the 
plaintiff against the defendant, who through the occurrence of the 
traumatic event may already be seen as the enemy.95 
Particularly in cases that involve harassment, a close examination of 
the plaintiffs conduct "for indications that she provoked or enjoyed the 
harassment provides women with a painful reminder of the law's historical 
mistreatment of rape victims.,,96 
1. The Cautionary Tale of Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite 
Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co. was the first sexual harassment class 
action to be certified.97 This extraordinary and heartbreaking case inspired 




92. Rebecca Korzek, Viewing North Country: Sexual Harassment Goes to the Mov-
ies, 36 U. BALT. L. REv. 303, 315 (2007). 
93. Edward J. Hickling et a\., The Psychological Impact of Litigation: Compensation 
Neurosis, Malingering, PTSD, Secondary Traumatization, and Other Lessons from MVAs 
[Motor Vehicle Accidents], 55 DEPAUL L. REv. 617, 630 (2006). 
94.Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Korzek, supra note 92, at 317-18. 
97. 139 F.R.D. 657, 667 (D. Minn. 1991), rev'd, 130 F.3d 1287 (8th CiT. 1998) (re-
manding for de novo trial on damages based on error of Special Master McNulty). See also 
CLARA BINGHAM & LAURA LEEDY GANSLER, CLASS ACTION: THE STORY OF LOIS JENSON 
AND THE LANDMARK CASE THAT CHANGED SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 243 (2002). 
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a nonfiction book98 and served as the inspiration for North Country, an 
Academy Award nominated film.99 The eleven-year long litigation pro-
vides a cautionary tale about abusive discovery and unchecked judicial dis-
cretion. Though hostile work environment cases are rare,IOO they provide 
vivid examples of the abuses that may arise in a gender discrimination class 
action. These cases also illustrate the challenges of pleading emotional dis-
tress damages, thus "opening the door" to intrusive questioning about men-
tal state and past trauma. 
Lois Jenson initiated a hostile work environment case by filing a com-
plaint with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights after suffering ex-
treme sexual harassment that included stalking, slurs, vulgar graffiti di-
rected towards her, and sexual attacks. 101 Other named plaintiffs in that 
case endured similar abuse. For example, on multiple occasions, Judy Jar-
vela opened her locker to find semen on her clothing. 102 Shirley Burton 
suffered such extreme harassment that she carried a can of mace, a pocket-
knife, and a length of rope to tie the door to her work area shut. 103 Kathy 
O'Brien carried a sharpened screwdriver in her boot after a coworker har-
assed and physically assaulted her during her first month of work. 104 Even 
when the women complained to management or to the union, little, if any-
98. See BINGHAM & GANSLER, supra note 97. 
99. NORTH COUNTRY (Warner Bros. Pictures 2005). Named plaintiff Lois Jenson became 
"Josie Aimes" in the film. The plot changed significantly from the true story - the writers con-
cocted a love story between Aimes and her attorney "Bill White," and Jenson's family story was 
changed. Id. In 2004, Jenson reported that she did not plan on seeing the film. Larry Oakes, Iron 
Range Feels Good but Uneasy About 'Class Action,' STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Oct. 17,2004, at 
3B. She also reported that six of the other named plaintiffs with whom she had spoken felt the 
same way and that they were upset it would be filmed in Eveleth, Minnesota. Id. Jenson reported 
that the other women felt "exploited." Id. Jenson also said that while she was proud of the case, 
she was appalled over its portrayal in Bingham and Gansler's book. Id. Jenson said that the book 
portrayed an overly grim and one-sided picture of the workplace and community, especially in 
regard to some of the male miners who stood up for the women. Id. 
100. See Melissa Hart, Book Review, Litigation Narratives: Why Jenson v. Eveleth 
Didn't Change Sexual Harassment Law, But Still Has a Story Worth Telling, 18 BERKELEY 
WOMEN'S L.J. 282, 288 (2003) (finding that between 1995 and 2002 there were only ten reported 
sexual harassment class actions that were certified and ten with certification denied). 
101. BINGHAM & GANSLER, supra note 97, at lOS. The details of Jenson's harassment are 
recounted in Chapters 3 and 5 of Bingham & Gansler's book. 
102. Id. at 47. 
103. Jon Tevlin, THE EVELETH MINES CASE: What Price Pain?, STAR 
TRIB.(Minneapolis), Nov. 29, I 99S, at IA. 
104. BINGHAM & GANSLER, supra note 97, at 54-55. In the lunchroom, a coworker 
named Frank Lipka yelled out in front of many others, "Hey Kathy, do you fuck on the job?" Id. 
Subsequently, Lipka tormented O'Brien by trapping a bat in the phone call box and then an-
nouncing over the PA system that O'Brien had a phone call. Id. O'Brien was afraid of bats and 
very startled by the incident. Id. She was sitting at a bench to calm down when Lipka came up 
and said, "I'll show you what will really scare you." Id. Then he twisted O'Brien's nose between 
the knuckles of his middle and index fmgers until her nose bled. Id. He then grabbed her feet and 
flipped her backwards off the table, causing her to knock her head against the wall. Id. Lipka 
was never formally disciplined but was moved to a different crew. Id. O'Brien started carrying a 
sharpened screwdriver in her boot and continued to do so for the next nine years. Id. 
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thing, was done to remedy the situation. 105 Instead, they faced retaliation 
for making complaints. l06 In an interview with the author, Jenson recalled 
her disappointment with the lack of support from her union. "The union 
pushed it to the point where we had to name them as defendants. We 
didn't want to name them because we all thought unions were important. 
Also, we knew if we named the union, it would be more difficult for us and 
we would face more opposition.,,107 
In litigation as a proposed class, counsel for the mines engaged in a 
"nuts and sluts,,108 strategy, attempting to paint the plaintiffs as unstable 
and sexually promiscuous.109 After the court certified the class and found 
the employers liable, it appointed Patrick McNulty as Special Master to 
manage discovery on damages. 1I0 Despite the plaintiffs' objections, the 
scope of discovery against the named plaintiffs was virtually limitless. III 
McNulty allowed a total of 7,469 pages of testimony during a seven-week 
trial and issued a 416-page Report and Recommendation. 112 
Defendants explored Jenson's past extensively and intrusively in dis-
covery, including scrutinizing an incident in her past when she was raped, 
which resulted in her pregnancy with her first child. 113 Though Jenson's 
attorneys objected to the scope of discovery, their objections were over-
ruled. 114 The only concession plaintiffs received from McNulty was that 
this information was at least to remain under seal. 115 Jenson was deeply 
afraid that her son would learn the painful story of his conception. 116 But 
Jenson was betrayed in a strikingly unprofessional and unethical move by 
lOS. BINGHAM & GANSLER, supra note 97, at passim. See also Telephone interview 
with Lois Jenson, supra note 1. 
106. BINGHAM & GANSLER, supra note 97, at passim. 
107. Telephone interview with Lois Jenson, supra note I. 
108. This rhyme may have been coined by author David Brock who, commenting on 
the confirmation hearings of Clarence Thomas, characterized Anita Hill as "a bit nutty, and 
a bit slutty." David Brock et aI., The Real Anita Hill, THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR, Mar. 
1992, at 18, 27. Hill accused Thomas of sexually harassing her with lurid sexual comments 
and pornography while she was his subordinate at the U.S. Department of Education and at 
the EEOC. BRAVO, supra note 9, at 98. See also Anita Hill, The Smear This Time, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 2, 2007, at A25 ("Regrettably, since 1991, I have repeatedly seen ... character 
attack(s) on women and men who complain of harassment and discrimination in the work-
place. . .. Those accused of inappropriate behavior also often portray the individuals who 
complain as bizarre caricatures of themselves - oversensitive, even fanatical, and often 
immoral - even though they enjoy good and productive working relationships with their 
colleagues."). 
109. Korzek, supra note 92, at 326. 
110. BINGHAM & GANSLER, supra note 97, at 277. 
Ill. See Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co. (Jenson 11), 130 F.3d 1287, 1290-91 (8th 
Cir.1997). 
112. Id. at 1290. See Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co. (Jenson I), No. 5-88-163, 1996 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17978 (D. Minn. Mar. 28, 1996). 
113. Jenson II, 130 F.3d at 1292. 
114. Id. at 1293. 
115. BINGHAM & GANSLER, supra note 97, at 349. 
116. See id. 
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the judge, who revealed as part of his voluminous opinion that "[i]n 1967, 
Jenson became pregnant by reason of what she now characterizes as 
rape. . .. [This] characterization of the event is not particularly important, 
in and of itself, ... [but] has importance as a reflection on credibility.,,117 
Another plaintiff, Jan Friend, dropped out of the case because she found it 
too painful to answer prying questions about her family, especially ques-
tions about her son, who had been convicted of murder. I 18 
McNulty awarded staggeringly low damages, a total of $182,500 for 
the entire class. 119 The plaintiffs appealed McNulty's findings, and the 
Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial. 120 The federal dis-
trict court judge to whom the case was assigned on remand was much more 
responsive to the plaintiffs' requests - one of his first preliminary rulings 
was that anything that had happened in the women's lives more than one 
year prior to the class period was not relevant, not discoverable, and not 
admissible. 121 On the eve of trial, the remaining fifteen plaintiffs settled 
for $3.5 million dollars, which amounted to more than $233,000 per per-
son.122 
This case sheds much light on the travails named plaintiffs face and on 
the sometimes disappointing results, despite the hard work, courage, and 
effort named plaintiffs and their attorneys put into the case. Cases like 
Jenson could discourage named plaintiffs from representing legitimate 
class claims, since to do so may put them at risk of court-condoned abuse, 
negative public exposure, and retaliation by coworkers. The individual 
willing to undertake the role of named plaintiff, as demonstrated by Jenson, 
must have great fortitude and courage to survive the defendant who turns 
the legal system into a tool to pursue abusive practices. 
In an interview with the author, Jenson reflected on her case and shared 
the advice she gives women who ask her if they should sue their employers 
over discrimination as Jenson did: 
Several women have talked to me about their experiences of being 
sexually harassed ... or other discrimination issues. Some have 
apologized for not fighting back. Most who have fought back are 
cautiously proud they took action, others not. In each discussion, 
there are the lingering effects of the issue(s) that made them feel 
powerless. I am not a cheerleader for any position. Some women 
117. Jenson I, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17978, at *313; BINGHAM & GANSLER, supra 
note 97, at 349. 
118. Korzek, supra note 92, at 313-14 (quoting BINGHAM & GANSLER, supra note 
97, at 286). 
119. BINGHAM & GANSLER, supra note 97, at 346. 
120. Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co. (Jenson II), 130 F.3d 1287, 1304 (8th CiT. 
1997). 
121. BINGHAM & GANSLER, supra note 97, at 368. 
122. Id. at 374-75. 
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need to walk away, others need to fight. I have had numerous calls 
from women in mid-stream of a case who are exhausted and on the 
edge of breaking. I urge them to do what is best for them. No mat-
ter what you do or try to do about a wrong done it remains that-
what has been done has been done. There is no taking it back [or] 
undoing it, but there is facing it, thoughtfully deciding what you 
want to do and being able to live with the choices you make. 
On the question of being a named plaintiff or lead plaintiff - you 
are signing up for the long haul. Some of those who sign on will 
demand much attention. Lead plaintiff does not mean psycholo-
gist, advisor or best friend. It means taking care of yourself first so 
you can take care of your responsibilities. Put energy into the 
process not the outcome. You cannot control others or outcomes 
but you can control how you feel and act. 123 
2. The Availability of Incentive Payments to Named Plaintiffs 
99 
For a role with so many pitfalls and risks, the potential rewards for 
named plaintiffs are often disproportionately small. The plaintiffs' bar and 
many scholars advocate incentive payments in settlements for named plain-
tiffs above and beyond any compensatory damages awarded to all class 
members. 124 The rationale for these payments is that named plaintiffs give 
much more of their time and energy to the case than absent class members, 
and therefore they deserve additional compensation for their service to the 
class. However, these awards are sporadically and inconsistently awarded 
in employment discrimination class actions in general. Researchers study-
ing 374 class action opinions for the years 1993 to 2002 found that less 
than half (forty-six percent) of employment discrimination awards included 
incentive payments for class representatives. 125 
Women's Committee for Equal Employment Opportunity v. National 
Broadcasting Corp. extolled the virtues of named plaintiffs in discrimina-
tion class actions and granted incentive awards in the settlement. 126 
Women's Committee provided a six-factor test for granting incentive 
awards: (I) effect of settlement as a whole on class members; (2) the possi-
bility of collusion between named plaintiffs and counsel; (3) objections to 
123. E-mail from Lois Jenson, Named Plaintiff, Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite, to author 
(Oct. 24, 2008,14:41:00 PST) (on file with author). 
124. See Ruan, supra note 4, at 397. 
125. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Incentive Awards to Class Actions 
Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study (Cornell Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 05-037, 2005; 
N.Y.U. Law and Economics, Research Paper No.06-03, 2005), available at http://ssm.com/ 
abstract=869308. 
126. Women's Comm.for Equal Employment Opportunity v. Nat 'I Broad. Corp., 76 
F.R.D. 173, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (finding that plaintiffs risked job security and the good 
will of coworkers and deserved incentive payments as part of the Rule 23(e) settlement). 
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settlement made by class members; (4) whether class members who had al-
ready filed their own claims of discrimination would relinquish their option 
to pursue these claims as a result of the suit; (5) the efforts made by named 
plaintiffs, their contribution to the litigation, and the social benefit of their 
suit (specifically acknowledging that the plaintiffs had undertaken signifi-
cant obligations, "perhaps at some risk to their job security and good will 
with coworkers"); and (6) the overall policy in favor of amicable settlement 
of legal disputes. 127 
Because of the sporadic and inconsistent nature of these incentive 
awards, class counsel considering such an award should: 
(I) keep time and expense records for named plaintiffs; (2) docu-
ment risks and retaliation; (3) plead individual claims; (4) negotiate 
individualized awards for each named plaintiff; (5) create a record 
that the settlement negotiations- and final settlement package are 
fair; (6) evaluate proportionality between class awards and named 
plaintiff awards; and (7) keep client expectation low because of the 
uncertainty of incentive payments. 128 
B. OBSERVATIONS ABOUT NAMED PLAINTIFFS 
In literature about discrimination class action cases, named plaintiffs 
often reflect that their primary goal was institutional change, not monetary 
gain. For example, Jenson's initial demand in response to the egregious 
harassment she suffered at the Eveleth Mine was merely for the implemen-
tation of a sexual harassment policy and to not have to work with her ha-
rasser. 129 
Brenda Schillaci was a plaintiff in the EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor 
Manufacturing of America, Inc. sexual harassment case. 130 Schillaci was 
reluctant to join the suit after having quit a job rife with harassment - she 
127. Sofia C. Hubscher, Making It Worth Plaintiffs' While: Extra Incentive Awards 
to Named Plaintiffs in Class Action Employment Discrimination Lawsuits, 23 COLUM. HUM. 
RTS. L. REv. 463, 477-79 (1992) (citing Women's Committee, 76 F.R.D. at 181-82). 
128. JOCELYN LARKIN, THE IMPACT FUND, INCENTIVE AWARDS TO CLASS 
REPRESENTATIVES IN CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS 15-16 (2005), available at http://www. 
impactfund.orglpdfs/Class%20Incentives%20UPDATED.pdf. 
129. BINGHAM & GANSLER, supra note 97, at 109. 
130. Ellen Warren & Nancy Millman, Abuse on the Line, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 15, 1998, 
at 10C. The plaintiffs in Mitsubishi claimed that they suffered widespread sexual harass-
ment in the Normal, Illinois, Mitsubishi plant. Press Release, EEOC, Mitsubishi Motor 
Manufacturing and EEOC Reach Voluntary Agreement to Settle Harassment Suit (Jun. II, 
1998), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/6-11-98.html. This case was the largest sex-
ual harassment class action ever brought under Title VII. The case settled eventually, with 
$34 million going to the class and an injunction that implemented changes to prevent sexual 
harassment at Mitsubishi. Press Release, EEOC, Monitors Say Mitsubishi in Compliance 
with EEOC Consent Decree (Sept. 6, 2000), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/pressl9-6-
OO.htmL 
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did not want to relive the trauma. 131 However, she decided to join after an 
EEOC attorney urged her to bring these abuses to light. 132 Prior to the 
eventual $34 million class settlement,133 Shillaci's husband described their 
decision-making process: "The more we thought about [joining the suit], 
the more we thought we could help to change conditions for the women at 
the plant. And, though a possible cash settlement wasn't the first thought, 
that, too, was a consideration. The monetary thing - [Brenda] deserves 
something.,,134 Carol Carr, another Mitsubishi plaintiff, agreed: "What I'd 
like to see come out of this is the guys treat the women like civil human be-
ings - like they'd like their mothers to be treated.,,135 Pioneer employ-
ment discrimination class action attorney Barry Goldstein reasons, "Clients 
who experience discrimination regularly understand, accept, and embrace 
the concepts implicit in representing a class." 136 
Betty Dukes, a named plaintiff in Dukes, is proud to speak on behalf of 
Wal-Mart women and recognizes that the suit can do what one person can-
not: 
"There was a lot of women in my store that felt. . . disenfran-
chised. Like I did. But who are you to stand up? You are just a 
little dog, and they got a dozen pit bulls." ... [After seeing the 
pleadings, she said,] "Betty Dukes versus Wal-Mart Stores .... It 
hasn't quite sunk in . . .. Now I'm in federal court. . .. And the 
lawsuit is in my name. And now they are spending millions of dol-
lars defending themselves .... We, the women of Wal-Mart, will 
have our day in court .... They will answer our charges: that they 
have treated us unfairly and we deserved better. Because we are 
the backbone of their company, and we have made them wealthy. 
We have made them wealthy.,,137 
Barry Goldstein reports that early race discrimination named plaintiffs 
were "natural leaders" who were involved in unionization efforts prior to 
the class action suit. 138 In his experience, union leaders typically make 
strong named plaintiffs because they already have experience leading their 
peers and are typically less intimidated by management than those without 
131. Warren & Millman, supra note 130. 
132.Id 
133. See Jon Bigness, Mitsubishi Settlement Checks on the Way; 486 Women Work-
ers to Share $34 Million, CHI. TRlB., June 26, 1999, at IN. 
134. Warren & Millmm,supro note 130. 
135.Id 
136. Goldstein, supra note 75, at 510. 
137. FEArnERSroNE, supro note 6, at 259-00. See also id. at 257 (quoting ~ Joyce Moody who 
says she is not involved in the suit for money but rather forthe company to become a better place for women). 
138. Interview with Barry Goldstein, OfO:lUn'le~ Goldstein, Demchak, Balla, Borgen & Dan:Iarim1, 
in Oakland, Cal. (Jan 17,2008). 
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such experience. 139 Bill Lann Lee, a leading civil rights attorney and a 
fonner United States Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, has also 
observed this trend in his practice. 140 Lee reasons that women's historical 
lack of access to leadership opportunities in unions has indirectly led to 
female named plaintiffs with less access to a built-in leadership system than 
male named plaintiffs. 141 Lee adds that he has found qualified named 
plaintiffs by looking for leaders in churches or community organizations. 142 
Jenson plaintiffs' attorney Jean Boler remembered named plaintiff Pat 
Kosmach as a natural leader. 143 
The rest of the women could rally around her. . .. She was a little 
older, and she'd been through a lot in her life already. She was 
fiery and articulate, but with the women she could be a mother fig-
ure. Even when she was in the hospital, the other women would go 
to her. 144 
Kosmach was a devoted union leader for years before the lawsuit, but her 
role as a named plaintiff in the suit drove a wedge between her and her un-
ion. 145 
In Lee's experience, a fairly high number of single mothers have 
served as named plaintiffs. 146 Lee reasons that this was because of the like-
lihood of their heightened economic vulnerability.147 Since single mothers 
139. Interview with Bany Goldstein, supra note 138. 
140. Interview with Bill Lann Lee, Shareholder, Lewis, Feinberg, Lee, Renaker & Jackson, P.e., in 
San Frnncisco, Cal. (Jan. 18,2008). 
141. Interview with Bill Lann Lee, supra note 140. 
142. !d. 
143. Doug Grow, Unsung Hero in Fight Against Eveleth Mines, STAR TRIB. (Min-
neapolis), Jan. 4,1999, at 2B. 
144. Grow, supra note 143. 
145. BINGHAM & GANSLER, supra note 97, at 65 ("Pat's commitment to the union 
movement and her authoritative personality landed her in a place where no woman had been 
before - the senior membership of the Steel Worker's Local 6860 . . .. Pat had a reputa-
tion at work for dragging men to Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, sending women with 
bruises on their faces to Range Mental Health, and keeping everyone's secrets. She was 
both opinionated and nurturing."); Telephone interview with Lois Jenson, supra note 1 ("Pat 
Kosmach felt like she was betraying her union by joining the lawsuit, but at the same time, 
the union wasn't standing by the women. She was a union officer who worked on human 
rights issues. This case was all about human rights. It wasn't until Pat saw the union presi-
dent talking to the company attorney during the trial and learning that he would testify 
against us that she got so upset that she knew she had to make a choice to cooperate more 
with our side. She had [initially] signed on with the case but was unwilling to provide evi-
dence that would clarify the union's obligation regarding discrimination. And it hurt her a 
lot to see the union take that side against the women."). 
146. Interview with Bill Lann Lee, supra note 140. This also may simply be reflec-
tive of the workforce. For example, many Wal-Mart hourly employees are single mothers. 
Compare Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 509 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2007) (list of named plaintiffs), 
with FEATHERSTONE, supra note 6, at II I, 117, 189 (describing named plaintiffs in Dukes as 
single mothers). 
147. Interview with Bill Lann Lee, supra note 140. 
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are the breadwinners for their families, discrimination that results in lower 
wages or lack of promotion opportunities puts their families in greater eco-
nomic jeopardy. 148 They likely have more to gain from eradicating discrimina-
tory systems than do women in dual income households.!49 However, this eco-
nomic vulnerability is a double-edged sword; the threat of 
losing their jobs to retaliation is a heightened economic risk for these women and 
their families. 150 
Though his case was an individual one, Percy Green may be seen as a pre-
cursor to the types of people who represent classes today. Green was the plain-
tiff in the foundational McDonnell Douglas v. Green, which set the standard for 
Title VII race discrimination suits.!S! He was a passionate and well-known civil 
rights activist in S1. Louis prior to litigating his case. 152 Green had been arrested 
over 100 times in civil rights protests spanning forty years. 153 He had utilized 
various high-profile tactics, such as climbing the St. Louis Gateway Arch while 
it was under construction to call attention to the lack of black workers on the pro-
ject and revealing the secret identity of the ''veiled prophet" master of ceremo-
nies at an all-white charity ball by literally unmasking him at the event. 154 On 
August 28, 1964, a month after Green climbed the arch, he was laid off from his 
job at McDonnell Douglas. ls5 His subsequent lawsuit is perhaps the most cited 
and well-known Title VII case. 1S6 His courage in pursuing civil rights for others 
remains an inspiration for named plaintiffs seeking to eradicate discriminatory 
employment practices for themselves and the class. 
It takes great fortitude of character to serve as a named plaintiff. Acknowl-
edging the bravery of named plaintiff Brenda Berkman in a protracted sex dis-
crimination class action against the New York City Fire Department, her attor-
ney Laura Sager proclaimed: 
Brenda performed the role of named plaintiff in a class action as well as 
anyone could possibly do. She did not merely lend her name to the 
case, but provided real leadership and support to the other women who 
wanted to be firefighters, the class members. This case went on for a 
long time [ten years], and Brenda was subjected to an extraordinary de-
gree of animosity and hatred, even receiving death threats. But she 
never wavered in her determination to see the case through and to be-
come a firefighter. 157 
148. Interview with Bill Lann Lee, supra note 140. 
149. !d. 
150. Jd. 
lSI. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 




156. Jd. at 35. 
157. Brenda Berkman et aI., Roundtable Discussion, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.1. 1355, 
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IV. COMMON EMPLOYER TACTICS 
A. EMPLOYERS USE RULE 23 AND MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
TO JUSTIFY INTRUSIVE DISCOVERY AND ATTACKS ON NAMED 
PLAINTIFFS 
Through discovery requests, including deposition questioning and re-
quests for documents, defendants attempt to line up summary judgment and 
Rule 23 challenges against named plaintiffs. Defendants sometimes push 
these justifications too far in attempts to either gain discrediting informa-
tion or simply to beleaguer or implicitly threaten named plaintiffs. The 
theory is that if defendants can "knock out" named plaintiffs, they can cur-
tail the litigation altogether. Though the case law does not strongly support 
this theory, the collateral damage against named plaintiffs and potential 
named plaintiffs who are too intimidated to step forward is significant. 
1. Motions for Summary Judgment Against Individual Named 
Plaintiffs' Claims 
With increasing frequency, defendants move for summary judgment 
against each named plaintiff before certification. 158 In anticipation of these 
motions, defendants sometimes move for dismissal of named plaintiffs on 
the merits during the class discovery period. 159 The defendants' motions 
then attempt to knock out the individual named plaintiffs' claims using the 
higher burden imposed on plaintiffs by the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work 160 for individual claims, rather than the Teamsters v. United States or 
Griggs v. Duke Power model for groups of plaintiffs. 161 If defendants are 
successful in asking the court to consider the claims under McDonnell 
Douglas, the plaintiffs lose the Teamsters' presumption of discrimination 
established by statistical evidence. 162 This places the named plaintiffs un-
der even closer scrutiny from the very beginning of the suit. Accomplished 
civil rights attorney Teresa Demchak posits that defendants try to knock out 
1359 (1999); Berkman v. City of New York, 536 F. Supp. 177 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), afJ'd, 705 
F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1983), later proceeding, 580 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.NY. 1983), afJ'd in part 
and rev'd in part, 812 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1987), and cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987). 
158. Interview with Teresa Demchak, supra note 22. 
159. {d. 
160. See 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The Court requires the complainant to show: (i) 
that she is a member of a protected class; Oi) that she applied and was qualified for a job for 
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite her qualifications, she was 
rejected; and (iv) that, after her rejection, the position remained open and the employer con-
tinued to seek applicants from persons of plaintiff's qualifications. !d. The burden then 
shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the em-
ployee's rejection. {d. 
161. Id. See also Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Griggs v. Duke 
Power, 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
162. See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Teamsters, 431 
U.S. at 339. 
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the named plaintiffs' claims as a strategy to defeat the case. 163 However, new 
named plaintiffs may be substituted if others are dismissed on summary judg-
ment. 164 Yet, if the plaintiffs who are dismissed have claims on which the stat-
ute of limitations rests, defendants may be able to narrow the class period or 
class size with this tactic. 165 After observing the treatment and scrutiny of the 
original named plaintiffs, Demchak points out that new named plaintiffs are 
likely to be very reluctant to step up. 166 
2. Resisting Class Certification on Rule 23 Grounds 
To prepare typicality and adequacy challenges, employers will often sub-
poena sensitive personal records from plaintiffs. Demchak reports, "Defen-
dants frequently try to subpoena prior work records, school transcripts, domes-
tic relations records, criminal records, and even bankruptcy records." 167 
Defendants will almost always attack named plaintiffs in their opposition 
to class certification motions. Though employers will not usually attack 
named plaintiffs on Rule 23 (a) (1 ) numerosity grounds, they may nonetheless 
attempt to cast doubt on the likelihood of the absent class members' claims or 
willingness to participate by submitting declarations from employees asserting 
that they have not been discriminated against. 168 Attacks based on commonal-
ity under Rule 23(a)(2) are more frequent than numerosity challenges, but 
these are more likely to focus on the claims of the class and the plaintiffs' ex-
pert reports on this issue. Defendants most commonly attack the typicality and 
adequacy of the named plaintiffs under Rule 23(a)(3) and Rule 23(a)(4). 
Wal-Mart attacked the Dukes named plaintiffs for not being typical of the 
purported class because some plaintiffs were paid more than most men in their 
stores. 169 Although a few of the named plaintiffs were among the highest paid 
workers in their stores, the plaintiffs argued that these women would have been 
paid more if they were men. 170 For example, Christine Kwapnoski was one of 
the higher wage eamers in her store after a seventeen-year tenureY' Yet 
Kwapnoski was paid the same as a male coworker who had worked for Sam's 
Club (a Wal-Mart subsidiary) half that time. 172 
163. Interview with Teresa Demchak, supra note 22. 
164. [d.; See, e.g., Larkin v. Pullman· Standard Div., Pullman, 854 F.2d 1549, 1560 
(lith Cir. 1988) (additional named plaintiffs had been added upon leave being granted by 
the court). See also Dukes Complaints, supra note 82. 
165. Interview with Teresa Demchak, supra note 22. 
166. !d. 
167. [d. 
168. See. e.g., Shores v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc. (Shores I), No. 94-1 1 62-CIV-T-
25(E), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3381, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 12,1996) ("Although Defendant 
did not directly address the issue of numerosity, it did submit hundreds of affidavits from 
women who believe that they have not been discriminated against."). 
169. FEATHERSTONE, supra note 6, at 136·37. 
170. [d. at 138. 
171. !d. 
172. [d. 
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In named plaintiff Edith Arana's deposition, the line of questioning 
pointed to a Rule 23(a)(3) typicality challenge. 173 Arana's attorney, Debra 
Smith of Equal Rights Advocates, recalls the defense counsel saying, "You've 
got more raises than anybody we know! How can you say you were discrimi-
nated against? Look you got a dollar raise.,,174 Defendants typically try to 
paint any positive employment action, minor as it may be, as probative of a 
lack of discrimination and also as a characteristic that causes the named plain-
tiff to diverge from other class members. Wal-Mart's typicality challenges 
were not successful. 175 
In Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., a sex-discrimination class action alleg-
ing that Costco discriminatorily failed to promote women, the defendant un-
successfully argued that the named plaintiffs lacked typicality because each 
presented unique claims. 176 Thus, defendant argued, they were atypical of the 
class. 177 Costco also argued that they lacked typicality because Costco in-
tended to present unique defenses to the gender discrimination claims of each 
named plaintiff 178 The court rejected this argument by stating that it "need not 
address the merits of each of the proposed defenses; rather, it is enough to say 
that as a general matter, individualized defenses do not defeat typicality.,,179 
Costco also attacked the named plaintiffs on adequacy grounds. First, the 
employer argued that those named plaintiffs who were former employees were 
inadequate because "they have little incentive to seek injunctive relief on be-
half of current employees.,,180 Costco then argued that the named plaintiff, 
who was then an Assistant General Manager, would have little incentive to 
seek injunctive relief for women seeking promotion to Assistant General Man-
ager. ISI However, the court reasoned that only if all of the named plaintiffs 
were only former employees, who would not stand to benefit from injunctive 
relief, might there be a conflict of interest with members of the class. t82 Fi-
nally, Costco attacked Ellis' credibility based on reports of her alleged mis-
treatment of employees and alleged misrepresentations on her job applica-
tion. 183 The court ruled against Costco on all these arguments, recognizing 
173. FEATHERSTONE, supra note 6, at 141-42. 
174. /d. at 14t. This dollar raise was the result of Arana's negotiation skills; the 
original offer was a raise of$0.25 per hour. {d. 
175. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 188 (N.D. Cal. 2004) 
(granting class certification), aff'd, 509 F.3d 1168, 1193 (9th CiT. 2007). 
176. Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 240 F.R.D. 627, 640 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
177. !d. 
178. Id. at 640-41. 





183. Ellis, 240 F.R.D. at 641. See, e.g., Costco's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Class Certification, Ellis, 240 F.R.D. at 627 (No. C04-334I MHP) ("Ellis's abrasive style .. 
. resurfaced ... when many employees complained about her brusque, demoralizing man-
ner."). 
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that even if the allegations against Ellis were proven true, they "would 
not rise to the level of prejudice to the unnamed class members."I84 
Defendants will also try to attack the financial ability of the named 
plaintiffs to pursue claims on behalf of the class. Traditionally, class 
counsel could advance the costs of civil rights litigation instead of having 
the whole financial liability fall on the named plaintiffs. 18s Today, some 
courts require plaintiffs to show ability to reimburse the attorney, some 
only pennit cost advances on a contingent basis, and some continue to 
subject cost advancement to special scrutiny to ensure that class counsel 
isn't standing in as a class representative. 186 Barry Goldstein recalls from 
his years working in litigation with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund that 
the organization diligently promoted the argument that it was legitimate 
for attorneys to assume financial liability so as not to deter meritorious 
claims. 18? Still, it was common - and remains so - for defendants to 
vigorously question named plaintiffs in depositions about their financial 
ability to pay, as well as their level of education under the Rule 23(a)(4) 
adequacy requirement. 188 
3. Settlement Offers to "Pick Off" Named Plaintiffs 
Depending on the court, defendants are sometimes permitted to try to 
moot the case by "picking off' named plaintiffs with Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 68 full offers of judgment before class certification. 189 Some 
courts have viewed these offers as mooting the case, even if the plaintiffs 
do not accept the offer of judgment. 190 These courts view the plaintiffs as 
having lost Article III standing by no longer having a personal stake in the 
litigation if the defendant offers to surrender all that the individual plaintiff 
seeks in the action. 191 Other courts look upon this practice unfavorably, 
since the class action vehicle is not only to vindicate the interests of named 
plaintiffs but also those of the absent class members. 192 
184. Ellis, 240 F.R.D. at 641. 
185. See 5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, § 23.25[2][ d][iv]. 
186. [d. 
187. Interview with Barry Goldstein, supra note 138. 
188. [d. 
189. David Hill Koysza, Note, Preventing Defendants from Mooting Class Actions 
by Picking Off Named Plaintiffs, 53 DUKE LJ. 781, 781 (2003). Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 68 provides that more than ten days before trial, a defendant may make a full offer of 
judgment. FED. R. CIv. P. 68(a). If the offer is not accepted, and what the plaintiff gets in 
the final judgment is not more favorable than the rejected offer, the plaintiff must pay the 
defendants' costs incurred after the offer. FED. R. CIv. P. 68(d). 
190. Koysza, supra note 189, at 782. 
191. !d. at 186-81 (citing Greisz v. Household Bank, 176 F.3d 1012, 1015 (7th CiT. 
1999) ("You cannot persist in suing after you've won.")). 
192. [d. at 192-93. 
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4. Discovery 
Abuse in depositions is disturbingly common and takes many forms. 
To begin with, the process itself is undoubtedly stressful and is typically a 
new and intimidating experience for the named plaintiff. To add to the 
stress, "[ d]epositions are the toughest place to protect a client because there 
isn't a trial judge in the room to tell the lawyers to behave themselves.,,193 
The questions themselves can be designed to intimidate rather than to 
gather useful evidence. 194 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 ("Rule 26") governs discovery and 
provides: 
Unless otherwise limited by court order. . . [p ]arties may obtain 
discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to 
any party's claim or defense. . .. Relevant information need not 
be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably cal-
culated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 195 
The permissiveness of the federal rule makes it difficult for class counsel to 
keep abusive discovery requests at bay. An employment discrimination 
plaintiff is likely to be served with requests for document production and 
questioned in depositions about her qualifications, her job performance, 
and all of her factual allegations in the case. It does not always stop there. 
Named plaintiffs have been asked about such embarrassing personal mat-
ters as child custody arrangements, sexual history, sexual orientation, 
criminal record, divorce proceedings, problems with her children, medical 
history, past childhood abuse,196 past sexual abuse,197 past psychological 
treatments, spousal drinking problems,198 spousal gambling problems, 199 
fidelity to her husband,20o her bra size,201 and the size of her husband's pe-
nis. 202 
A deposition from Ellis provides an illustration of the types of intimi-
dating, even hostile, questions asked of named plaintiffs. In the deposition, 
Costeo's attorney aggressively questioned the plaintiff about a traumatic 
experience at work where her warehouse manager sexually assaulted 
193. BINGHAM & GANSLER, supra note 97, at 191. 
194. Jane H. Aiken, Protecting Plaintiffs' Sexual Pasts: Coping with Preconceptions 
Through Discretion, 51 EMORY L.J. 559, 560-61 (2002) (arguing that defendants use the 
threat of abusive discovery to intimidate plaintiffs into dropping their cases or dropping out 
as named plaintiff). 
195. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(I) (emphasis added). 
196. Interview with Linda Dardarian, Parmer, Goldstein, Demchak, Baller, Borgen 




200. See Zabrowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780, 782 (E.D. Wis. 1984). 
201. Telephone Interview with Noelle Brennan, supra note 9. 
202. Id. 
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her.203 Costco's attorney relentlessly questioned the plaintiff, corning off 
as condescending and skeptical. 204 At one point, Costco' s attorney even 
directed the plaintiff to physically reenact the assault. 205 
Under the current rules, this type of questioning is impossible to avoid 
completely. It is worth noting that the plaintiffs in Ellis did not pray for 
class relief under a hostile work environment theory.206 Nor did the Ellis 
named plaintiff file any individual claims for sexual harassment. 207 The 
harassment was mentioned in the motion for class certification as anecdotal 
evidence of a discriminatory environment, not as a separate claim. 208 In its 
opposition to the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, Costco attacked 
the named plaintiff under the Rule 23(a)(3) typicality requirement because 
she had experienced sexual harassment in addition to discrimination in 
promotion. 209 Costco argued that her claims were thus unique and atypical 
of the class.21O In certifying the class, Judge Patel rejected these arguments 
because there were no allegations in the complaint that would suggest the 
named plaintiffs pled sexual harassment claims as part of the action. 211 
In Shores, named plaintiff Susan Sharp endured an extremely abusive 
deposition. 212 Linda Dardarian, an attorney involved in Shores, has been 
practicing civil rights law for nearly twenty years.213 Dardarian says that 
employers often prepare for depositions by interviewing all of the named 
plaintiffs' coworkers. 214 During the Shores litigation, Publix interviewed 
everyone in the named plaintiffs' work sites, including employees who 
were also personal friends and acquaintances of the plaintiffs. 215 This can 
be coercive to the employees who are not necessarily accustomed to being 
interviewed by attorneys.216 In those interviews, Publix was able to dis-
cover information not related to the workplace and information that was 
bound to be embarrassing. 217 Publix discovered one such story about 
203. Deposition of Plaintiff, Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 240 F.R.D. 627 (N.D. 
Cal. 2007) (on file with author) (confidentiality assured). 
204. Deposition of Plaintiff, Ellis, 240 F.R.D. at 627. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. at 641 ("There are no allegations in the complaint that would suggest that 
[the named plaintiffs] have brought sexual harassment claims as part of this action .... "). 
207. Id. 
208. Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification and Appointment of Counsel at 22, 
Ellis, 240 F.R.D. at 627 (No. C-04-3341 MHP), available at http://genderclassaction-
gainstcostco.com /costc094.pl?wsi=0&websys_screen=aIUegalpapers. 
209. Costco's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, supra note 
183 at *14. 
210. Ellis, 240 F.R.D. at 640-41. 
211. Id. at 641. 
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Sharp.218 At one point during her employment, while trying to joke 
around and "fit in" with her coworkers in the meat department, Sharp per-
fonned fellatio on a banana.219 Publix used this to argue that all of the sexual 
harassment Sharp was subjected to was welcome. 220 The banana incident 
was not part of Sharp's individual sexual harassment claim, which was based 
on her manager fondling her, pressing her up against a wall, kissing her 
against her will, making harassing comments, quid pro quo harassment, and 
threats of retaliation. 221 The class claims were for failure to promote. 222 
Barbara B. Brown of Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker deposed 
Sharp. 223 At one point in the deposition, Brown began questioning Sharp 
about the "banana incident," which made Sharp very uncomfortable. 224 
Brown continued to press Sharp about the details of the banana incident, over 
her counsel's objections. 225 Brown then pulled a banana out of her briefcase, 
pointed it at Sharp, and asked Sharp to demonstrate her actions on the ba-
nana, all while the deposition was being videotaped. 226 Sharp broke into 
sobs and was unable to speak. 227 Her attorney objected to the questioning 
and halted the deposition. 228 This incident upset Sharp terribly and stayed 
with her throughout the litigation.229 She repeatedly considered dropping out 
of her role as a named plaintiff, even though her claims were very strong.230 
In the end, she nearly halted the settlement because she felt she deserved 
more money than was being offered for all that she had gone through, not 
only because of the discrimination she suffered at Publix, but also because of 
the way Publix's attorney treated her during this deposition.23I 
In the private Mitsubishi case,232 the employer pursued an inundation 
strategy for discovery. 233 Mitsubishi issued 500 subpoenas to fonner em-
ployers, doctors, gynecologists, and psychologists of the twenty-eight named 
plaintiffs. 234 Defense counsel questioned Mitsubishi named plaintiffs so ag-
gressively in depositions that many of the women felt like they were the ones 














232. There was both a private case and a subsequent EEOC case related to the Mit-
subishi harassment 
233. BRAVO, supra note 9, at 110. Some in the plant referred to these plaintiffs deri-
sively as the "dirty thirty." Warren & Millman, supra note 130. 
234. BRAVO, supra note 9, at 110. 
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on trial. 235 
Fonner EEOC attorney, Noelle Brennan, now in private practice with 
the plaintiffs' finn of Noelle Brennan & Associates, recalls numerous 
deposition abuses in the landmark Mitsubishi and EEOC v. Dial Corp. sex-
ual harassment class cases that she litigated 236 In Dial, Brennan defended 
the deposition of a plaintiff whose mental health records had been subpoe-
naed.237 Dial's lawyers asked the plaintiff questions about her divorce, her 
relationship with her children, and detailed questions about decades-old in-
stances of childhood sexual abuse. 238 At one point, one of Dial's attorneys 
loudly whispered to her colleague, "Ask her if there was actual penetra-
tion.,,2)9 The whisper was audible on the other side of the table, and the 
plaintiff said on the record, "1 heard that.,,24o Brennan objected frequently 
and asked opposing counsel to limit the abusive inquiry, but they relent-
lessly argued that their questions were within the scope of discovery.241 
"The questions were a way to intimidate, embarrass, humiliate, and recreate 
the feelings of abuse," Brennan said. 242 Brennan also observed more in-
vidious psychological consequences for this client. "These questions made 
her feel like there was something wrong with her; that she must have 
brought it on herself.,,243 
In a subsequent Dial deposition, another plaintiff spoke in detail about 
twenty instances of touching and lewd comments.244 One of the defense 
attorneys leaned over and whispered to her colleague, "Oh she must have 
been really popular.,,245 Again, this comment was audible to the room. 246 
Brennan ended the deposition immediately.247 The plaintiff eventually re-
ceived an apology. 248 
These depositions were not just taxing in the types of questions asked 
or comments made, but also in the time defendants took to depose named 
plaintiffs or the logistics involved in getting to the deposition site. In 2000, 
the maximum time allotted for deposition of an individual witness or party 
was reduced to "one day of seven hours.,,249 This was a great help to 
235. BRAVO, supra note 9, at 110. 
236. Telephone Interview with Noelle Brennan, supra note 9. See EEOC v. Dial 
Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d 926 (N.D. Ill. 2001). 












249. See FED. R. Cry. P. 30 advisory committee's note (2000). 
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named plaintiffs, who, prior to the amendment, were often subpoenaed for 
multiple days of depositions. 250 Their attorneys were simply unable to suf-
ficiently protect them under the prior discovery rules since defendants had 
the right to virtually unlimited deposition time if the judge would allow it. 
This tactic was particularly taxing on the working-class male and female 
named plaintiffs that Lee represented in the Barefield v. Chevron race dis-
crimination class action. 251 The depositions, in addition to being frustrat-
ing, time-consuming, and emotionally taxing, were logistically difficult as 
the plaintiffs would need to arrange travel, childcare, and time off from 
work. 252 
The Jenson plaintiffs suffered under the pre-2000 rule allowing for 
longer depositions. Lois Jenson's first deposition in 1990 lasted five hours, 
during which she was relentlessly questioned about her children, being 
raped, a suicide attempt, and whether or not she swore at work. 253 Jenson 
reflected later, "I felt like a house had been dropped on my head.,,254 
Claire Bell, Jenson's therapist, explained, "Just think of every painful thing 
that has happened in your life, [and] imagine it being brought up by an ad-
verse attorney in some sterile boardroom.,,255 Jenson's second deposition 
lasted nine hours and twenty minutes. 256 
B. RETALIATION AGAINST PLAINTIFFS AND CLASS MEMBERS STILL 
EMPLOYED BY THE DEFENDANT; COERCIVE ACTIONS TO DETER 
OTHERS FROM JOINING THE SUIT 
1. Adverse Employment Actions Against Named Plaintiffs 
Named plaintiffs incur significant risks involving their employment if 
they are currently working for the defendant. 257 Title VII prohibits materi-
ally adverse employment actions as a response to a legally protected activ-
ity, such as complaining of discrimination to the human resources depart-
ment, filing a charge with the EEOC, or initiating a private lawsuit. 258 
Despite Title VII protection, retaliation against those who challenge dis-
crimination is frequent. In addition to the more overt adverse actions such 
250. Interview with Bill Lann Lee, supra note 140. Other plaintiffs' attorneys have 
agreed that this was a positive change for their clients. See Interview with David Borgen, 
Partner, Goldstein, Demchak, Baller, Borgen & Dardarian, in Oakland, Cal. (Oct. 22, 2008) 
("Depositions used to be much longer and were worse for the plaintiffs. There's nothing 
civil about civil litigation!"); Interview with Linda Dardarian, supra note 196. 
251. Interview with Bill Lann Lee, supra note 140. 
252. Id. 
253. BINGHAM & GANSLER, supra note 97, at 192-95. 
254. Id. at 195. 
255. Id. 
256. Id. at 196. 
257. Hubscher, supra note 127, at 470. 
258. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-3(a) (2000). 
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as tennination, pay cuts, or demotions, harder-to-prove retaliation occurs in 
the forms of alienation, "smear campaigns," and threats, discussed at 
greater length in the next section. 259 
In a gender discrimination class action against Morgan Stanley, named 
plaintiff Allison Schieffelin was overtly retaliated against after filing her 
EEOC charge. 260 Schieffelin had worked for fourteen years at Morgan 
Stanley. 26 1 She recalls her employer's initial response: 
[S]enior managers at the firm sought to denigrate my work, ostra-
cize me. . .. They took away projects that I had worked on for 
years. They diminished my daily responsibilities. I believe that 
they thought that if they made my day-to-day life miserable enough 
that I would just pack up and leave.262 
When Schieffelin did not resign, she was tenninated.263 
Patricia Shiu, a leading plaintiffs' attorney and vice president at The 
Legal Aid Society-Employment Law Center,264 has litigated numerous in-
dividual and class gender discrimination cases. 265 Shiu reports that the 
most common forms of retaliation against her class and individual clients 
include pay cuts, demotions, assignments to less desirable shifts and loca-
tions, loss of one's office, and denials of training. 266 If someone had com-
plained about the discriminatory conduct prior to litigation, retaliation 
against her was likely to be quite severe.267 Shiu recalls a former client 
who had filed an individual pregnancy discrimination suit and then later re-
turned to work after maternity leave.268 Her assignments devolved from 
substantive and rewarding work, like what she had done prior to her leave, 
to full-time photocopying. 269 
It is worth noting that the Wal-Mart defendants have sometimes em-
ployed a different strategy. Though named plaintiffs report retaliation, 
259. Telephone Interview with Noelle Brennan, supra note 9. 
260. BRAVO, supra note 9, at 14-15. See generally SUSAN ANTILLA, TALES FROM THE 
BOOM BOOM ROOM: WOMEN VS. WALL STREET (2002). 
261. BRAVO, supra note 9, at 15. 
262. [d. 
263. [d.; ANTILLA,supra note 260, at 266. 
264. The Legal Aid Society-Employment Law Center is a nonprofit organization 
based in San Francisco, California, that aims to promote the stability of low income and dis-
advantaged workers and their families by addressing the issues that affect their ability to 
achieve self-sufficiency. The organization serves thousands in the community each year 
through litigation, direct services, and legislative advocacy. See Legal Aid Society-
Employment Law Center, About Us, http://www.las-elc.org!aboutus.html(last visited Oct. 
25,2008). 
265. Interview with Patricia Shiu, Vice President, Programs, Legal Aid Society-




269. Interview with Patricia Shiu, supra note 265. 
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some also received long-sought raises and promotions,270 in what were per-
haps attempts to set up subsequent typicality challenges. 
2. Alienation From Coworkers and Workplace "Smear Campaigns" 
An employee who continues to work for the defendant after filing suit 
is likely to suffer "ostracism and disrespect in an extremely uncomfortable 
and hostile environrnent.,,271 Teresa Demchak reasons that a major prob-
lem with existing retaliation protections is that the retaliation is often more 
of a subtle backlash than termination, demotion, or a pay cut. 272 
For example, Dukes witness Micki Earwood believed that her partici-
pation in the lawsuit prompted her store managers to conduct a "smear 
campaign" against her among her coworkers. 273 Earwood claimed the 
managers lied and told coworkers that she had breached the confidentiality 
obligations of her job and had discussed employee wages with other co-
workers. 274 Earwood felt that she had lost friends over these rumors. 275 
She recalled an incident in which she ran into a former coworker at a 
mall. 276 As they talked, the friend seemed very nervous even to be seen 
speaking with her. 277 For Earwood, this alienation carried over to other 
jobs as well. 278 Earwood said, "You know, you have an outstanding inter-
view and everything goes well, and they were gonna call your references, 
and you never hear from them again. And you have to wonder .... ,,279 
Stephanie OdIe, the named plaintiff who initiated the Wal-Mart suit, 
was retaliated against in subsequent jobs with Old Navy and Aeropostale 
for her public involvement in the case. 280 OdIe told author Lisa Feather-
stone, "Just because you're trying to fight for your constitutional rights and 
make a change, make a difference! You'd think people would be like, 
'You go!' But instead you're labeled a troublemaker." 281 As it stands 
now, unfortunately, "being a named plaintiff is not a good career move, 
unless the employer is unique and willing to learn from mitakes.,,282 
270. FEATHERSTONE, supra note 6, at 122 (Named plaintiff Christine Krapnoski tried 
to get promoted for years but once the lawsuit was filed, reflected, "I have a very intricate 
promotion timeline. It just depends what the lawsuit is doing."). 
27 I. Hubscher, supra note 127, at 470. 
272. Interview with Teresa Demchak, supra note 22. 





278. [d. at 256. 
279. !d. 
280. [d. at 256-57. 
281. [d. at 257. See also Hubscher, supra note 127, at 470 ("Even an employee who 
was wrongly discharged and no longer maintains a relationship with her employer may suf-
fer from a scarred reputation as a trouble-maker within the industry where she works, and 
may thereby experience difficulty obtaining a new job."). 
282. Interview with Teresa Demchak, supra note 22. 
Winter 2009] NO GOOD DEED GOES UNPUNISHED 115 
3. Coercion of Potential Class Members 
In addition to retaliation against plaintiffs, employers frequently pressure 
potential class members to refrain from complaining and to support the defense 
of their case. Like the tactic of facilitating coworker alienation, employers 
may attempt to spread misinformation and to intimidate class members into 
opting out of the class. In addition to the obvious coercion that can result, 
these tactics further affect named plaintiffs by isolating them from their peers. 
In Jenson and Mitsubishi, the employers initiated petitions from other fe-
male employees to attest that they had not been harassed or discriminated 
against. 283 In Mitsubishi, fifty-eight buses, paid for by the company, trans-
ported 3,000 workers (on the clock) to the EEOC headquarters in Chicago to 
picket the agency's court filing. 284 It was later discovered that many of the 
plaintiffs' coworkers felt pressured to attend this rally and feared retaliation if 
they did not attend. 285 
A few months before the Jenson class certification hearing, four female 
miners were called for a meeting with the union's lawyer.286 Though he did 
not disclose it, one of the lawyers present was an attorney for the mine. 287 The 
union representative told the women that the plaintiffs in the lawsuit were su-
ing the union for all of its money but that there was no reason for the case to go 
to COurt.288 The women were then presented with highlighted sections of Pat 
Kosmach's and Lois Jenson's depositions. 289 "Those were the sections they 
wanted us to say didn't happen," recalled one employee,z9o The union repre-
sentative also said that the plaintiffs were using these "petty complaints" to 
bankrupt the union and get rich. 291 
In Shores, the defendant waged an aggressive workplace campaign 
against the lawsuit. 292 In granting an order to compel Publix to provide "cura-
tive notice" to its employees to counteract its communications with employees, 
the court stated: 
Publix has complete control over the information disseminated di-
rectly to its employees at the workplace. Publix utilizes several in-
house communication tools to communicate with its employees 
and it has used each of these tools to inform employees of the 
283. BINGHAM & GANSLER, supra note 97, at 224-25. 
284. Warren & Millman, supra note 130. 
285. Id. 
286. BINGHAM & GANSLER, supra note 97, at 199. 
287. Id. 
288. Id. 
289. Id. at 200. 
290. Id. 
291. Id. 
292. Shores v. Publix Super Mkts. (Shores II), Inc., No. 95-1 I 62-CIV-T-25(E), 1996 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22396, at *3-4 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 1996), vacated per settlement agree-
ment, Shores v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc. (Shores III), No. 95-1 I 62-CIV-T-25E, 1997 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 16778 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 27,1997). 
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company's position on this litigation. . .. [TJhe Court is gravely 
concerned about the impact Publix's past communications may 
have had on class members. 293 
Upon review of the communications, the court agreed with the plaintiffs 
that the communications were "intended to discourage class members from 
participation in this litigation.,,294 The court cited an example of Pub Ii x us-
ing its communications to discourage participation in the suit through its 
assertions concerning the potential availability of relief. 295 Soon after class 
certification was granted, defendants released a "Publix Pulse" video that 
included these statements: 
Even if Publix is found liable in court, which we believe is 
unlikely, each member of the class will still have to prove the mer-
its of her case on an individual basis to receive any payment. 
In a case represented by the same attorneys against Safeway 
Stores, class members averaged $250 each before taxes, while their 
lawyers collected 2.5 million dol1ars. 296 
Publix also distributed brochures that implied that employees' partici-
pation in the litigation would harm the company and their coworkers. 297 
The brochure included in its question-and-answer section: "Can Lawsuits 
Against Publix Affect Me? Yes. The cost of defending even baseless law-
suits can hurt our profits, our gross, our careers and our job security.,,298 
The court's extensive order directed Publix to distribute notice directly to 
thousands of class members, enclose the notice with their paychecks, and to 
post the notice in employee lounges, by the time clocks, and in the newslet-
ter. 299 The court further required that the notice include a description of the 
lawsuit, options for class members, and the contact information for all class 
counsel, including a toll-free number. 300 
C. ATTACKS AGAINST NAMED PLAINTIFFS OUTSIDE THE WORKPLACE 
I. Private Investigation 
Named plaintiffs also face retaliation outside the workplace. 
Patricia Shiu surmises that private investigators were hired in approxi-
mately ninety percent of her cases to "dig up dirt" on her clients. 301 
293. Shores 11,1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22396, at *4, *8. 
294. ld. at *5. 
295. /d. at *6. 
296. /d. 
297. ld. at *7-8. 
298. /d. at *8 (internal quotations omitted). 
299. ld. at *12-13. 
300. /d. at (114-17, *20-21. 
301 Interview with Patricia Shiu, supra note 265. 
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This practice often causes named plaintiffs to feel persecuted, like they 
are the ones on trial. 302 Shiu concludes that it takes a "stable and secure 
person to withstand this level of scrutiny and insult.,,303 Shiu empha-
sizes that because of this reality, it is absolutely critical to investigate 
clients' backgrounds before litigation in order to protect them from any 
"skeletons" defendants might find. 304 
2. Attacks in the Press 
Defendants often try to use their media leverage to gain public sup-
port for their position and to turn public sentiment against the plaintiffs. 
In the contentious EEOC Mitsubishi case the defendant waged a vitri-
olic "press war" against the EEOC. 305 Mitsubishi challenged the 
EEOC's contact with potential class members and publicly moved for 
sanctions against the agency for communications with potential com-
plainants. 306 The motion was denied and the judge chastised Mitsubishi 
for its tactics: "There is nothing new here, and Mitsubishi's attempt to 
incite public opinion against the EEOC by publicizing such a fact ... 
comes closer to violating the court's prior rulings than the EEOC's let-
ter.,,307 The judge later characterized Mitsubishi's intransigence with 
the EEOC's conciliation efforts as a "cat-and-mouse" game.,,308 Mitsu-
bishi's attacks were ultimately unsuccessful. Mitsubishi eventually set-
tled for $34 million, the largest sexual harassment settlement in history 
at that point. 309 
Given the anti-class action sentiment from the business community, 
corporations have the deck stacked in their favor with certain news 
sources. Some commentators will do their work for them. After Judge 
Jenkins granted class certification in Dukes, Wal-Mart found support in 
the business press: "[T]he Wall Street Journal editorial page ... went 
far beyond Wal-Mart's own argument, not only contesting the class cer-
tification but asserting that Betty Dukes didn't deserve to be 
promoted .... ,,310 
However, many media outlets were far less sympathetic to Wal-Mart's 
position. After receiving negative press from the Dukes suit, Wal-Mart, for 
302. Interview with Patricia Shiu, supra note 265. 
303. Id. 
304. Id. 
305. See Judge Chides Mitsubishi on EEOC Matter, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 28, 1997, at 4N 
(discussing Mitsubishi's attempts to "incite public opinion against the EEOC"). See also 
EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1059, 1091. See supra note 284 
and accompanying text (discussing Mitsubishi busing 3,000 employees to protest outside 
EEOC headquarters in Chicago). 
306. Judge Chides Mitsubishi on EEOC Matter, supra note 305. 
307. Id. 
308. Mitsubishi, 990 F. Supp. at 1091. 
309. See Bigness, supra note 133. 
31 O. FEATHERSTONE, supra note 6, at 246. 
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the first time in its history, hired a public relations firm to conduct "reputa-
tion research," which resulted in an ad campaign with a new spin.31J This 
campaign included commercials featuring "Margaret," a district manager 
who confides to the audience that Wal-Mart helps her balance family and 
career, as well as advertisements featuring women in nontraditional jobs, 
like trucking. 312 
In addition to its extensive internal campaign against the lawsuit, Pub-
lix also waged a public press campaign against it. 313 Judge Adams chided 
both parties for the heavy publicity on both sides and noted that the defen-
dant took advantage of its public position. 314 "A myriad of newspaper arti-
cles and television programs have featured aspects of this litigation. Addi-
tionally, Publix has waged an aggressive publicity campaign directed at its 
customers with paid newspaper advertisements; posters, fliers and grocery 
bags.,,315 
Noelle Brennan views these press attacks as harmful to named plain-
tiffs in many ways.316 Perhaps most importantly, the employers' vigorous 
defense sends an implicit encouragement to employees to retaliate against 
those who come forward.317 The press attacks also make it more dangerous 
for other employees to cooperate with the EEOC investigation or to serve 
as witnesses. 318 Plaintiffs' attorneys have difficulty doing "damage con-
trol" after press attacks because it is often impossible to identify which em-
ployees have been affected by the campaigns. 319 
3. Threats of Violence or Other Criminal Activity 
Named plaintiffs in some major workplace discrimination cases have 
faced violent retaliation. For example, a week after filing a union griev-
ance against the supervisor who had been stalking her, Lois Jenson found 
all four tires of her car slashed. 320 
In Mitsubishi, after charges were filed, the plant provided a sexual 
harassment training session. One of the class members was at the training 
and observed a male coworker stand up and proclaim to the auditorium, 
"I'll tell you one f-ing thing. Whoever turns me in and tries to cause me 
311. FEATHERSTONE, supra note 6, at 250-51. 
312. ld. at 246. Wal-Mart launched a website, http://www.walmartfacts.com.to 
counteract bad press in January 2005. !d. at 261. 
313. Shores v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc. (Shores II), No. 95-1 I 62-CIV-T-25(E), 1996 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22396, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 1996), vacated per settlement agree-
ment, Shores v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc. (Shores III), No. 95-1 I 62-CIV-T-25E, 1997 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 16778 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 1997). 
314. Shores 11,1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22396, at *3. 
315. ld. 




320. BINGHAM & GANSLER, supra note 97, at III. 
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to lose my job is going to lose theirs toO.,,321 No one, including the train-
ers or manager present, said a thing. 322 In another incident at the plant, 
someone wrote, "If any cunt causes me to lose my job, I am going on a 
cunt hunt," in the women's bathroom. 323 
Retaliation occurred at the Dial factory in response to complaints of 
harassment as well. According to Brennan, "After a woman complained 
of sexual harassment against her supervisor, a co-worker came up to her 
and grabbed her by the crotch (lifting her off the ground), jerking her up-
wards, and screamed, 'you f-ing bitch, do you like this?' Unfortunately, 
I have tons of examples like these.,,324 Brennan believes that the em-
ployer's failure to condemn this type of retaliation discouraged more 
women from coming forward. 325 Stories of retaliation also instilled fear 
in those who would otherwise cooperate with the EEOC investigation.326 
Though plaintiffs' lawyers did their best to limit these practices and vig-
orously monitor for retaliation, it was very difficult to determine who was 
being affected beyond the plaintiffs, and it was sometimes difficult to 
prove retaliation when no overt adverse employment action had been 
taken. 327 
Patricia Shiu has also represented plaintiffs who have been threatened 
with violence against themselves and their families as a result of the liti-
gation. 328 Shiu adds that plaintiffs who are immigrants or women of 
color may often be subjected to some of the most reprehensible retalia-
tion. 329 
V. PROTECTING NAMED PLAINTIFFS 
A. PROCEDURAL AND PRACTICAL TACTICS FOR PROTECTING NAMED 
PLAINTIFFS FROM ABUSE, EMBARRASSMENT, AND RETALIATION 
1. Protective Orders and Sanctions 
Plaintiffs' counsel should not hesitate to move for protective orders 
and sanctions in response to abusive discovery requests. 330 When protec-
321. Telephone Interview with Noelle Brennan, supra note 9. 
322. ld. 
323. ld. 
324. E-mail from Noelle Brennan, Partner, Noelle Brennan & Associates, to author 
(Mar. 5,2008, 14:40:00 PST) (on file with author). 
325. Telephone Interview with Noelle Brennan, supra note 9. 
326. /d. 
327. /d. 
328. Interview with Patricia Shiu, supra note 265. 
329. /d. 
330. Rule 26(b)(2)(C) provides: 
On motion or on its own, the court must limit the frequency or extent of dis-
covery otherwise allowed by these rules or by local rule if it determines that: 
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be 
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tive orders are not successful, or defendants' conduct is extreme, it is vi-
tal for plaintiffs' counsel to move for sanctions quickly.331 Rule 23 en-
courages and broadly allows for judicial intervention into the manage-
ment of the case. Rule 23( d)(1 )(B) grants the judge the explicit authority 
to require that, "to protect class members and fairly conduct the action," 
notice be given to some or all class members to apprise them of the pro-
ceedings and to give the class members an opportunity to voice their con-
cerns, intervene, or give their opinion of the class counsel's quality of 
representation.332 The judge may also, in her discretion, "impose condi-
tions on the representative parties,,,333 and she possesses a catchall au-
thority to "deal with similar procedural matters.,,334 Rule 23(d)(1)(A) al-
lows the court to "determine the course of proceedings or prescribe 
measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in presenting evi-
dence or argument.,,335 
These discretionary grants of authority provide the judge the power to 
preemptively limit discovery to protect named plaintiffs. The Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure clearly anticipate that the judge will need to pro-
tect the absent class members. However, as demonstrated by the experi-
obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, 
or less expensive; 
(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the in-
formation by discovery in the action; or 
(iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely 
benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the 
parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the 
importance of discovery in resolving the issues. 
FED. R. Ctv. P. 26(b)(2)(C). Rule 26(c)(I) provides: 
A party or any person from whom discovery is sought may move for a pro-
tective order in the court where the action is pending. . .. The court may, 
for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, 
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including.one or 
more of the following: 
(A) forbidding the disclosure or discovery; 
(B) specifying terms, including time and place, for the disclosure or discov-
ery; 
(C) prescribing a discovery method other than the one selected by the party 
seeking discovery; 
(D) forbidding inquiry into certain matters, or limiting the scope of disclo-
sure or discovery to certain matters; 
(F) requiring that a deposition be sealed and opened only on court order; 
(H) requiring that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or in-
formation in sealed envelopes, to be opened as the court directs. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(I) (emphasis added). 
331. Interview with Patricia Shiu, supra note 265. 
332. FED. R. Ctv. P. 23(d)(I)(B). 
333. FED. R. Ctv. P. 23(d)(I)(C). 
334. FED. R. Ctv. P. 23(d)(I)(E). 
335. FED. R. Ctv. P. 23 (d)(1 )(A). 
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ence of named plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases, a greater measure of 
protection is necessary for them. Judges should be urged to extend the 
same protective role reserved for class members to named plaintiffs as 
well. 
An example of the court imposing sanctions against an employer can be 
found in Bockman v. Lucky Stores, where defendants vigorously attacked 
the named plaintiffs and their counsel on adequacy grounds by alleging that 
the attorneys had colluded with a named plaintiff. 336 Defendants claimed 
the information came from a phone call from the former husband of a 
named plaintiff. 337 Defendants could produce no further evidence of the 
call. 338 In their motion to decertify, defendants asserted that "[p] laintiffs' 
counsel's ethical violations are patent and unambiguous ... and concluded 
that such conduct renders plaintiffs' counsel, and hence plaintiffs, inade-
quate class representatives. " 339 The court denied the motion and chastised 
the defendants for "cho[osing] to rely solely upon the unreliable word of a 
man who was not directly involved in this litigation.,,34o The court imposed 
sanctions of attorneys' fees and costs for the wasted time after finding that 
the defendants had not followed the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11, which provides that signed court filings must include asser-
tions "formed after a reasonable inquiry" and not presented for an improper 
purpose. 341 
Plaintiffs' attorneys should always be vigilant about retaliation and stay 
in close contact with their clients on this matter. If retaliation occurs, coun-
sel should amend the complaint to include the retaliation and file a retalia-
tion charge with the EEOC if appropriate. 342 These remedial actions may 
discourage employers from using such tactics in any future litigation. 
2. The Use of Federal Rule of Evidence 412 against Discovery 
Requests Involving Sexual Past or Predisposition of Plaintiffs 
Federal Rule of Evidence 412 ("Rule 412"), the "Rape Shield" rule, 
was established in 1978 to protect crime victims. In 1994, it was extended 
by statute (after the Supreme Court rejected the advisory committee's 
change to the rule) to include civil cases.343 It is designed to prevent find-
336. Bockman v. Lucky Stores, 108 F.R.D. 296 (C.D. Cal. 1985), ajJ'd, 826 F.2d 
1069 (9th Clf. 1987). 
337. ld. 
338. Id. 
339. Id. Note that this case predates the 2003 separation of adequacy of counsel 
from the Rule 23(a)(4) requirements. This requirement was subsequently added as Rule 
23(g). 
340. /d. at 298. 
341. /d. at 297. See FED. R.Civ. P. II. 
342. Interview with Barry Goldstein, supra note 138. 
343. See Aiken, supra note 194, at 563-64. Rule 412 provides, in relevant part: 
(a) EVIDENCE GENERALLY INADMISSIBLE. The following evidence 
is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual 
122 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20: 1 
ers of fact from placing excessive probative value on matters that should 
not affect their decisions. 344 Though plaintiffs in civil actions premised on 
sexual misconduct have the same concerns that give rise to the need for 
rape shield legislation in criminal cases, Rule 412's protections for victims 
of crime are greater than those afforded to parties in civil cases. 345 
Despite the limitations of Rule 412, plaintiffs' attorneys should be vigi-
lant about discovery requests that delve into sexual past or "predisposition" 
of named plaintiffs. The drafters of Rule 412 were aware that the same con~ 
cerns at trial existed throughout the discovery process and thus urged judges 
to curb abuses throughout litigation. 346 The advisory committee's notes to 
the revised Rule 412 state, "Courts should presumptively issue protective or-
ders barring discovery unless the party seeking discovery makes a showing 
that the evidence sought to be discovered would be relevant ... and cannot 
be obtained except through discovery.,,347 Federal courts have significant 
misconduct ... : 
(1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other sex-
ual behavior. 
(2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual predisposition. 
(b) EXCEPTIONS. 
(\) In a criminal case, the following evidence is admissible ... : 
(A) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim 
offered to prove that a person other than the accused was the source of se-
men, injury or other physical evidence; 
(B) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim 
with respect to the person accused of the sexual misconduct offered by the 
accused to prove consent or by the prosecution; and 
(C) evidence the exclusion of which would violate the constitutional rights 
of the defendant. 
(2) In a civil case, evidence offered to prove the sexual behavior or sexual 
predisposition of any alleged victim is admissible if it is otherwise admissi-
ble under these rules and its probative value substantially outweighs the 
danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party. Evidence 
of an alleged victim's reputation is admissible only if it has been placed in 
controversy by the alleged victim .... 
FED. R. EVID. 412 (emphasis added). 
344. Aiken, supra note 194, at 560. 
345. Jd. at 559-60, 575-76. Unfortunately, the broad grant of judicial discretion of 
Rule 412(b)(3) has resulted in divergent rulings on the admissibility of even substantially 
similar evidence. Given the disparity in resources between a typical plaintiff and a typical 
defendant in a sexual harassment case, plaintiffs' need for protection is at least as great as 
that of crime victims. Some courts have acquiesced to the admission of sexual character 
evidence without even referencing Rule 412. Compare Rodriguez-Hernandez v. Miranda-
Velez, 132 F.3d 848, 855-56 (1st Cir. 1998), with Barta v. City and County of Honolulu, 
169 F.R.D. 132 (D. Haw. 1996). See also McCleland v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., No. 
95 C 237, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14012, at *3, *6 n.1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25,1995) (admitting, 
over plaintiffs' Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403 objections, evidence of "any pre-
adolescent or adolescent parental sexual, physical, mental or emotional abuse" in a non-
class sexual harassment case with multiple plaintiffs where Rule 412 did not apply because 
the purpose of the evidence was not for sexual behavior or predisposition but for defending 
against emotional distress causation claims). 
346. Aiken, supra note 194, at 566. 
347. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note (1994). 
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power, should they choose to use it, to grant protective orders to limit abu-
sive defenses that implicate Rule 412 issues. 348 However, the plaintiff must 
affmnatively invoke the Rule 412 protections through a motion for a protec-
tive order. 349 
3. Preparing Named Plaintiffs for the Challenges of the Role 
It is important for plaintiffs' attorneys to research named plaintiffs thor-
oughly before filing the initial complaint. This includes, with permission, 
pulling criminal records of the named plaintiff and her family and asking 
about any medical condition that may be embarrassing to discuss. Research 
into family law issues, including domestic violence, divorce, or custody is-
sues that may be sensitive to the named plaintiff, is also important. It is also 
prudent to go through the potential named plaintiffs' resumes with them and 
ask about any inaccuracies or inconsistencies. The existence of vulnerabili-
ties is not necessarily a reason not to file suit, but it is important to avoid any 
surprises by formulating a damage control plan from the outset. 350 "It's very 
common to have [the employer's attorney] attack plaintiffs," says Barry 
Goldstein in reflection on Haynes v. Shonies. 351 "It's one of the things you 
have to counsel plaintiffs about, especially if you bring a big suit. But no-
body's record is perfect. Nobody's a perfect employee. You don't have to 
be a perfect employee to be a successful Title VII plaintiff.,,352 
It is key to brief the named plaintiffs on the legal requirements of 
representing a class and what will be expected of them. 353 Class coun-
sel are wise to require potential named plaintiffs to sign Named Plaintiff 
Agreements, in addition to the routine retainer agreement,354 to ensure 
that named plaintiffs are aware of the rigorous duties of their role in the 
litigation. 
Named plaintiffs also must be thoroughly informed and prepared for 
the onslaught of employer attacks. Linda Dardarian reasons: 
It is not possible to prevent these abuses altogether. The best thing 
to do is prevent damage through thorough preparation. Plaintiffs' 
attorneys must foster a very trusting and open relationship with 
their clients. Plaintiffs need to feel comfortable and to trust you 
enough to tell you about any possible "skeleton in the closet" be-
348. Aiken, supra note 194, at 566-67. 
349. Id. at 567. 
350. Interview with Bill Lann Lee, supra note 140. See, e.g., Tevlin, supra note 103 
(discussing the Jenson plaintiffs: "It hasn't been easy. Some of the plaintiffs grew up rough, 
and had all the characteristics of imperfect people from imperfect families. Drinking prob-
lems. Domestic abuse. Rape. Incest. Divorce. The mine's lawyers made sure it all be-
came public when the women filed suit ... "). 
351. STEVE WATKINS, THE BLACK 0 38 (1997). 
352. Id. 
353. Goldstein, supra note 75, at 523. 
354. Id. 
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fore defendants get a hold of it. The best practice is to warn plain-
tiffs about potential abuses and assure them that you will vigor-
ously work to prevent this. It is important to explain to them the 
bottom line, that these abusive tactics are merely a sideshow. 355 
Lois Jenson offers a named plaintiffs perspective on how named plain-
tiffs should prepare themselves, and on how plaintiffs' attorneys can best 
serve their clients in what may be a rough time: 
Ask questions, let me know you have heard what I am saying 
versus what your secretary just handed you or the paper you are 
reading on your desk .... 
Keep in touch with clients, six months without contacting a cli-
ent is too long. 
Don't forget to let me know a judge's ruling .... A person who 
goes to a lawyer is depending on them to be ethical, informed and 
professional. Don't call your client a liar, play devil's advocate 
with them, criticize them or complain to them about your personal 
life .... Don't assume! Understand that when people hire lawyers 
they want lawyers who are looking out for their client's best inter-
ests because if they do that the client will recommend and stand tall 
with the attorney at the end . . .. [T]he client hires a lawyer, the 
lawyer works for the client not the other way around. And don't 
screw it up so you can stand tall with your clients at the end. Your 
job is [a] lawyer but it is a client's life (figuratively and sometime 
for real). It is not about you. It is about your client(s). It is about 
the job you do and how well you represent your client - that [part] 
is about yoU. 356 
4. Effective Use of the Press 
To counterbalance the ill effects of negative press on named plaintiffs 
and on the case, plaintiffs' lawyers should effectively use the press to pub-
licize their clients' claims. This publicity can indirectly show support and 
publicly acknowledge the bravery of named plaintiffs. Engaging public 
sympathy for the case is important and can be heartening to the named 
plaintiffs in the more difficult times in litigation. Teresa Demchak suggests 
that plaintiffs' lawyers pursue initial publicity in a balanced manner; state-
ments should not be too negative nor should they be too emotional. 357 It is 
important to have a good relationship with the media, and it is common to see 
355. Interview with Linda Dardarian, supra note 196. 
356. E-mail from Lois Jenson, supra note 123. 
357. Interview with Teresa Demchak., supra note 22. 
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websites and press releases from class counsel throughout the litigation proc-
ess. 358 The goal should be to educate the public and effectively utilize these 
communications as the first introduction of your case to the defendants. 359 
Demchak cautions, "[Plaintiffs' attorneys] shouldn't be throwing bombs.,,360 
Noelle Brennan agrees and suggests writing press releases to correspond with 
each filing. 361 
The plaintiffs' class action firm of Sprenger & Lang, which has offices in 
Minneapolis, MN and Washington, DC, keeps a New York City-based publi-
cist on retainer to keep the press and the legal community aware of its activi-
ties. 362 Nonetheless, not all publicity works as well as planned. In the Jenson 
case, Paul Sprenger made a somewhat incendiary statement about the case that 
backfired and caused the named plaintiffs to lose community support. 363 After 
a day in court, Sprenger described the harassment at Eveleth Mines: "I think 
that the behavior was... barbaric, inhuman, they've been through a lot. 
They're frightened to death.,,364 Shortly thereafter, a local paper ran a cartoon 
of a tourist couple driving, passing a road sign depicting a caveman carrying a 
club and dragging a woman by the hair. 365 The female passenger in the car-
toon says, "Oh look, Larry, we must be near Eveleth Mines!,,366 
That was not the only incident where use of the media backfired. A photo 
of Lois Jenson appeared in a profile about the case by Glamour Magazine. 367 
Later, defaced copies of her picture from the article were repeatedly plastered 
on mine bulletin boards. 368 
B. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
Though there are many tools that can and should be used by plaintiffs' at-
torneys to protect against discovery abuse, the system, itself, must be reexam-
ined. The very fact that these abuses are so common is symptomatic of a sys-
tem failing to promote justice for named plaintiffs. 
358. Interview with Teresa Demchak, supra note 22. Compare Wal-Mart Class 
Website, http://www.walmartclass.comlpublic_ home.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2008), with 
Sanford, Wittels & Heisler Cases and Settlements [Information Page], 
http://www.nydclaw.comlcases.php (last visited Nov. 9, 2008). See also Morgan Stanley 
Sex Discrimination [Website], http://www.sprengerlang.comlcases/ case-listlmorganstanley 
(last visited Nov. 9, 2008). 
359. Interview with Teresa Demchak, supra note 22. 
360. Id. 
361. Telephone Interview with Noelle Brennan, supra note 9. 
362. David Phelps, From Eveleth to Hollywood. STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Apr. 21, 
2002, at !D. 
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1. Legislative Changes 
Rule 23 should be amended to mandate even closer discovery man-
agement by judges. A subsection could address class certification discov-
ery in bifurcated trials and enumerate narrower limits for the showing nec-
essary for Rules 23(a)(3) and Rule 23 (a)(4). Limiting the adequacy and 
typicality inquiries to matters closely related to the claims would protect 
named plaintiffs from the current level of unnecessary intrusion into their 
personal lives. 
Numerous legislative solutions have been proposed to remedy discov-
ery abuses in sexual harassment cases. Many scholars have argued against 
the different standards for admissibility of sexual past or predisposition 
evidence for civil and criminal cases under Rule 412. They argue that the 
danger of the retraumatizing effect is just as manifest in civil cases as in 
criminal ones. 369 Jane Aiken suggests amending Rule 412(b)(2) to bring it 
in line with the criminal rule, minimize judicial discretion, and eliminate 
the opportunity for defendants to use embarrassing information for "har-
assment value" alone. 37o To remedy the gap between the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure on discovery and the Federal Rules of Evidence, Richard 
Bell argues that Rule 26 should be amended to protect plaintiffs in discov-
ery by mandating that sexual evidence be granted presumptive confidential-
ity.371 
Perhaps a more compelling proposal is to amend Rule 26 to include 
more explicit limitations for discrimination plaintiffs. The rule should ac-
knowledge that abuses can occur and thus create a presumption against dis-
covery requests regarding sensitive material, including, but not limited to, 
childhood sexual abuse, past sexual assault, child custody arrangements, 
financial information, and medical records. With this presumption, the 
burden would fall on defendants to justify the need for sensitive evidence 
and show with precision how the sensitive matters requested are likely to 
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
2. Reform at a Local Level 
Federal District Court Local Rules often provide specific requirements 
for class actions that go beyond what Rule 23 requires. 372 Advocating for 
369. See, e.g., Aiken, supra note 194, at 559; Andrea A. Curcio, Rule 412 Laid Bare: 
A Procedural Rule that Cannot Adequately Protect Sexual Harassment Plaintiffi from Em-
barraSSing Exposure, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 125, 127 (1998). 
370. Aiken, supra note 194, at 582, 584. 
371. Richard C. Bell, Shielding Parties to Title VII Actions for Sexual Harassment 
from the Discovery of Their Sexual History Should Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence Be Applicable to Discovery?, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 285, 342 
(1998). 
372. See, e.g., N.D. Fla. R. 23.1, available at http://www.flnd.uscourts.gov/forrns/ 
Court%20RulesllocaIRules2004.pdf (requiring detailed factual allegations showing prereq-
uisites to a class action); N.D.N.Y. R. 16.1,23.1, 23.2, available at http://www.nynd.us 
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District Courts to amend their local rules to provide greater protection 
in discovery for discrimination class action named plaintiffs, though 
piecemeal, could curb abusive practices. 373 A proposed local rule sub-
section follows: 
DISCOVERY IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLASS 
ACTIONS: In a bifurcated action, the scope of class certifica-
tion discovery shall be confined narrowly to the claims pro-
pounded. Owing to the sometimes sensitive nature of the 
claims, and the relative bargaining power of the parties, de fen-
dant(s) must make an affirmative showing of a substantial like-
lihood of the discovery of relevant evidence before seeking in-
formation from plaintiffs and putative class members about: 
(a) personal records predating the class period, including but not 
limited to, medical records and domestic relations court orders; 
(b) highly sensitive matters of a sexual nature likely to cause 
embarrassment or discomfort; 
(c) any other matter the Court, in its discretion, deems to have a 
high likelihood of abuse and a low likelihood of probative 
value. 
To address concerns about retaliation, case management provisions 
of local rules could be amended to require the judge to monitor for re-
taliation. This could create something of a judge's "checklist," affirma-
tively and continually ensuring that there are no instances of retaliation 
and sending the message to defendants that retaliation will not be toler-
ated. 374 
Another tactic is to emphize judicial education. Patricia Shiu served 
on California's Gender Bias Task Force, a group of lawyers, judges, 
legislators, and advocates appointed by California Supreme Court Chief 
Justice Rose Byrd, whose mission was to raise awareness about and de-
sign judicial education and courtroom protocols addressing gender bias 
against female litigants, witnesses, and attorneys. 375 Such task forces 
evaluate the presence of bias in the courts and seek to cure it.376 Task 
courts.gov/documents/lr2008.pdf (scheduling the timing of class actions); D. Neb. R. 23.1, 
available at http://www.ned.uscourts.govllocalrulesINECivR_07-0126.pdf (additional no-
tice requirements). 
373. Interview with Bill Lann Lee, supra note 140. 
374. Id. 
375. Interview with Patricia Shiu, supra note 265. See LYNN HECHT SCHAFRAN & 
NORMA JULIET WIKLER, FOUND. FOR WOMEN JUDGES, OPERATING A TASK FORCE ON GENDER 
BIAS IN THE COURTS: A MANUAL FOR ACTION (1986), http://womenlaw.stanford.edulgender-
bias. pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2008). 
376. Interview with Patricia Shiu, supra note 265. 
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forces should focus attention on the abuses detailed above and offer 
suggestions for reform. Shiu urges more public accountability of this 
sort because consciousness of gender bias has led to pragmatic reforms 
and systematic changes that could be useful in the sex discrimination 
class action context. 377 
Finally, judges are often at least partially responsible for the instances 
when settlement terms are not effectively enforced and discrimination is 
permitted to persist. Since the level of court supervision required after liti-
gation is high, many judges do not actively participate or are unable to con-
tinue actively supervising settlements because of their workloads. 378 Im-
proving judicial education on the process and importance of effective 
monitoring of injunctive remedies could compel judges to more fully ap-
preciate the important responsibility of this role. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Though the attacks on named plaintiffs are varied in form, they can be 
devastating to the people involved. These attacks compromise the integrity of 
the justice system while also deterring potential plaintiffs from coming for-
ward. Rule 23 was enacted to create the opportunity to provide relief to groups 
of people who have suffered the same hann. This important goal is under-
mined when employers are permitted to attack the representative parties with 
the intent of creating a headless class through a "divide and conquer strategy." 
The focus should not be on the individuals serving as named plaintiffs but 
rather on their claims and those of the class. While defense counsel has a duty 
to zealously advocate for their clients, this duty must not extend to engaging in 
behavior with the intent to hann, intimidate, threaten, or harass. Plaintiffs' at-
torneys have a variety of tools they can use to protect against these attacks, but 
more must be done to protect these individuals. Legislative reform, changes in 
local rules, and judicial education are some suggestions to advance a system in 
which good deeds are celebrated, not punished. 
377. Interview with Patricia Shiu, supra note 265. 
378. See FEATHERSTONE, supra note 6, at 168. 
